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“We are all human, we all make mistakes and learn from 
them—especially 15 years later—and we all deserve second 
chances.”  
– HUD Secretary Ben Carson1 
 
Close to fifty years after President Richard Nixon’s 1971 declaration of 
a War on Drugs,2 America is attempting to remedy the aftermath.  Today, the 
War is generally considered a failure.3  Despite all the arrests and 
prosecutions, the War has been unsuccessful in accomplishing its two touted 
objectives: eliminating drug trafficking and eliminating drug addiction in the 
United States.4  America paid dearly; it was extremely expensive,5 
disproportionately impacted communities of color,6 and took hundreds of 
 
© 2021 Lahny Silva. 
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 1. Lola Fadulu & Glenn Thrush, Democrats Angered by HUD’s Hiring of Trump Aid Who 
Quit After Racist Posts, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/ 
politics/trump-aide-racism.html (quoting HUD Secretary of State Ben Carson defending his hiring 
of former Consumer Financial Protection Bureau official Eric Blankenstein, who quickly resigned 
from the post when information was disclosed showing Blankenstein used racial slurs in blog posts 
in 2004). 
 2. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, PBS FRONTLINE, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited May 26, 2021); Am. 
Judicatire Soc’y, It Is Time to End the War on Drugs, 93 JUDICATURE 48, 83 (2009); JILL JONNES, 
HEP-CATS, NARCS, AND PIPE DREAMS: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S ROMANCE WITH ILLEGAL 
DRUGS 261 (1996); EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA 178 (1977). 
 3. Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The Continued 
Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. 2–3 (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-counting-continued-failure-war-
drugs; MATTHEW B. ROBINSON & RENEE G. SCHERLEN, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND DRUG WAR 
STATISTICS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CLAIMS MADE BY THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL POLICY 12 (2007); see Am. Judicature Soc’y, supra note 2; Michael Tonry, Race and the 
War on Drugs, 82 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25, 26 (1994); Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on 
America, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 242, 242 (1991). 
 4. Bruce Bullington & Alan A. Block, A Trojan Horse: Anti-Communism and the War on 
Drugs, 14 CONTEMP. CRISES 39 (1990). 
 5. Coyne & Hall, supra note 3, at 2–3.  
 6. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82 
(1995); Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The Quest for a Racially Neutral 
Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUST. 427, 431, 481 (2000). 
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thousands of prisoners.  This final cost was highlighted when the “the land 
of the free” earned the number one spot for having the highest incarceration 
rate in the world.7  
Recognizing the substantial costs associated with wartime criminal laws 
and sentencing practices, a criminal justice reform is currently sweeping 
through legislatures across the country.8  In the spirit of fair sentencing and 
second chances, legislatures are commissioning studies of sentencing 
regimes and modifying criminal penalties with retroactive application.9  The 
return of judicial discretion with the United Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Booker10 now allows punishments that deviate from 
otherwise strict determinate criminal sentences.11  And clemency is making 
a comeback, with both Presidents Obama and Trump utilizing the executive 
power to commute overly punitive terms of imprisonment.12  Over 100 days 
into his administration, President Biden has not yet made his views clear on 
clemency.  Ex-offender reentry as a substantive and procedural legal issue is 
now considered a legitimate legislative concern, with Congress putting 
federal dollars behind evidence-based programs proven to reduce 
recidivism.13  States are following suit.14  Although this is a positive step in 
undoing decades of ineffective policy, other areas of law impacted by the 
Drug War must also be reviewed and modified if the damage caused is to be 
truly rectified.  
Wartime legislation contributed to the proliferation of not only criminal 
statutes and sanctions, but also numerous civil penalties associated with drug-
 
 7. SENTENCIN’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1, 2 (last updated 
May 2021), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-
Corrections.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
 8. Lucia Bragg, Federal Criminal Justice Reform in 2018, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/federal-
criminal-justice-reform-in-2018.aspx.  
 9. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 and 28 U.S.C.); First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 34, and 42 U.S.C.); see also Bragg, supra note 
8.  Modifying criminal penalties with retroactive application allows individuals to be resentenced 
for past crimes according to the current sentencing schema, which changed the penalties associated 
with certain drug crimes. 
 10. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 245–46.  
 12. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 811, 837 (2017); Pardons Granted by President Donald J. Trump (2017–2021), U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (last updated Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/pardons-granted-president-
donald-j-trump-2017-2021. 
 13. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9.  
 14. Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy 
Initiatives to Reduce Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2007). 
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related suspicion and/or conviction.15  Drug war policies bled over into civil 
and administrative areas of law, manifesting in rules that work as a form of 
further government control—wreaking havoc on poor, mostly minority 
communities that already absorbed the bulk of the War’s attacks on the 
criminal front.  Commonly referred to as the “collateral consequences of 
conviction” in the academic literature, these civil statutes and administrative 
regulations are pervasive and pernicious, hindering the transition from prison 
to society.16  Collateral consequences affect almost every part of one’s life: 
areas that are essential to productive citizenship and socio-economic stability.  
As the War seems to be winding down on the criminal front, other rules 
continue to endure and serve as the predicate for intensive regulation and 
exclusion in civil and administrative matters such as voting, employment, 
and housing.  
This Article contributes to the existing scholarship on the War on Drugs, 
collateral consequences, and offender reentry by reviewing federal criminal 
and housing laws in the aftermath of redemptive rhetoric that has been 
employed to pronounce a retreat from the War.  It applies drug war criticisms 
to federal housing policy and argues that the ideological shift away from 
“tough on crime” to “second chances” in the criminal context must be 
extended to national housing policy.  I argue that wartime costs associated 
with criminal law are mimicked in the federal housing policy context, a 
battleground during the War on Drugs.  More specifically, I argue that with 
wartime policy deeply penetrating the national housing agenda, the drug laws 
continue to serve as a justification to inflict socio-economic violence on 
targeted groups.  This violence takes the form of intensive regulation in 
federal housing programs and operates as an additional layer of 
criminalization and social control on an already powerless group.   
In neglecting to review wartime policies beyond the criminal law, this 
Article contends that policymakers are creating an ideological schism that 
has manifested in an inconsistent legislative agenda.  There are thus two 
systems: one where prisoners of the War are to be viewed as redeemed and 
worthy of a second chance, and the other where prisoners of the War continue 
 
 15. Rabiah Alicia Burks, Laws Keep Ex-Offenders from Finding Work, Experts Say, LEGAL 
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.legalnews.com/oakland/1030871.  
 16. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1821–31 (2012); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, 
Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 585, 594–99 (2006); see also Christopher Mele & Teresa A. 
Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social Policy, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES 9, 19–20 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller eds., 2005); Jeremy Travis, 
Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 20–22 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-
Lind eds., 2002). 
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to be demonized and excluded from mainstream society.  In the criminal 
context, the government is pivoting from taking people out of their 
communities and incarcerating them to now releasing  the legislative pressure 
valves to open the prison gates and release prisoners of the War.  The question 
is: Where will they all live?  Housing is identified as the primary barrier for 
those reintegrating.17  During this reform movement, legislators are 
overlooking collateral consequences affecting housing prospects for criminal 
justice-involved individuals, especially drug offenders, thus continuing the 
War on the civil front.  This Article reasons that the next natural step in the 
retreat from the War’s policies is to review and modify Drug War legislation 
that transcends criminal law.  This is a necessity if the proclaimed political 
promise of a second chance is to be truly fulfilled.  If it is not, then the 
redemptive rhetoric is nothing but a trap—a political ploy used to pander to 
public opinion on the criminal justice front, while laying cover to the grave 
legislative mistakes made in the shadows on the civil front during the War. 
This Article is divided into three primary parts: The Frame, the War, 
and the Aftershock.  Part I will present a framework to analyze the costs 
associated with the War in both criminal law and federal housing policy.18  
This Part will present Drug War criticisms as the lens through which socio-
economic violence caused by wartime federal housing rules ought to be 
viewed.  In doing so, Part I will offer a new approach to understanding the 
breadth and depth of the War on Drugs.  Instead of assessing the War as a 
battle waged only in the criminal sphere, it should be evaluated as an attack 
encompassing all law—the criminal law, as well as civil and administrative 
law.  In understanding the War as a monolithic effort that bridged both 
criminal and civil law, I will evaluate the socio-economic assault on targeted 
groups in the housing context arguing that true reform must take a holistic 
view of the costs of wartime policy.   
Part II will examine the War on Drugs’ criminal law policies, pointing 
out signature pieces of legislation enacted during the 1980s,19 to later 
demonstrate the recent government changes to this specific legislation.20  
This Part will also analyze the War’s influence on federal housing policies 
through the review of various statutes that reflect the government’s 
aggressive stance on drugs.  More specifically, the public housing and 
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and Certificate (“HCV”) programs will 
be examined.  Housing policy was chosen as the case study because (a) 
 
 17. DOUGLAS B. HALL & LISA KOLOVICH, EVALUATION OF THE PRISONER RE-ENTRY 
INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT, DEP’T LABOR EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., 107, tbl IV.19 (2009). 
 18. See infra Part I.  
 19. See infra Part II.  
 20. See infra Part III.  
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federal subsidized housing was a targeted war zone in the War on Drugs21 
and (b) research demonstrates that housing currently presents the greatest 
barrier to reentry.22  Each section in Part II also will offer an outcomes 
assessment of wartime policy in the criminal and housing contexts, with an 
emphasis on the failure of the War to accomplish its twin goals of eliminating 
drug trafficking and reducing drug abuse.  
Part III will assess the retreat from the War on Drugs and the reform of 
anti-drug criminal law policies within each of the three branches of 
government.23  Like the previous Part, Part III also will review the impact (or 
lack thereof) of the criminal justice reforms on housing policy, concluding 
that the ideological underpinnings of redemption have yet to penetrate the 
national housing agenda, leaving harsh, anti-drug housing legislation on the 
books.  Finally, Part IV will provide a brief summary of the Article’s thesis.24  
In doing so, Part IV reiterates the strong call for review and reform of national 
housing policy at all levels and within all branches of government.   
I. THE FRAME 
 
“There’s a War goin’on outside no man is safe from.”  
– Mobb Deep25 
 
To appreciate the magnitude of the costs associated with the War on 
Drugs, it is important to grasp the full scope of the harms that flow from it.  
From the bar to the bench, law schools to prisons, and probation departments 
to mental health institutions—critics attack.  They cite the harshness and 
inequality of the criminal laws and the enormous financial expenditures on 
prosecutions and corrections.26  Critics also point to the unfairness of the 
collateral consequences of criminal convictions and the double tax or penalty 
that such rules impose on prisoners once they are released.27  Scholars and 
practitioners alike have provided vital works on collateral consequences in 
 
 21. Bernida Reagan, The War on Drugs: A War Against Women, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
203, 207 (1990). 
 22. HALL & KOLOVICH, supra note 17, at 107, tbl IV.19. 
 23. See infra Part III.  
 24. See infra Part IV.  
 25. MOBB DEEP, Survival of the Fittest, on THE INFAMOUS (RCA Records 1995). 
 26. Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2016). 
 27. Pinard & Thompson, supra note 16, at 594–99; Mele & Miller, supra note 16, at 19–20; 
Travis, supra note 16, at 15, 22–23. 
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the areas of civil liberties,28 employment,29 and the receipt of public 
assistance30 in a broad sense.  These arguments together provide a strong 
foundation for understanding the need to reform wartime policy and the 
prison industrial complex.  However, the call for reform must be extended to 
the entirety of the social carceral state so that the basic American normative 
principles of equality, fairness, and freedom are rewoven into the fabric of 
the social order in a way that is inclusive of those given a “second chance.”  
The criminal law story of the War is well-documented, voluminous, and, of 
course, critical.  But the other story of the War—the civil side—offers a more 
insidious account and remains the status quo.   
The frame that will be used in this Article is an amalgamation of Drug 
War critiques centered on the expansion of the enforcement power of the 
police and prosecutors.  The Drug War critiques include a review of the 
economic, social, and racial repercussions associated with wartime policies.  
In addition, the concentration on enforcement is perhaps the most significant, 
as the greatest discretion in the criminal system is vested in prosecutors and 
the police.  To show the changes in policy during the War, a review of 
legislation is required, followed by an analysis of its impact, which is to be 
driven by wartime critiques.  To properly situate the housing discussion, this 
Article first provides a review of Drug War criminal policy. In applying the 
frame to housing policy, this Article examines the expansion of the drug 
enforcement powers in the housing context.  Here, power was vested not only 
in the police but also the public housing authorities.  Thus, the War on Drugs 
stretched far beyond the four corners of the criminal code and was launched 
just as aggressively in other areas of the law.   
As will be discussed, the War on Drugs sparked the massive 
mobilization of resources against two demonized groups: the drug addict and 
the drug dealer.  Through legislative fiat, Congress provided manpower, 
money, and military machinery to wage a total war against targeted groups 
 
 28. See generally JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); see also Chin, supra note 16, at 
1821–31. 
 29. BRUCE WESTERN & BECKY PETTIT, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 11 (2010); Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: 
Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 
165 (2010); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2003); JEREMY TRAVIS, 
AMY L. SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLIC’Y CTR. 32 (2001), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf.  
 30. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 35 (2011); Priscilla Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: 
Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 
1564 (2012). 
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and areas suspected of a drug infestation.  Total war required that vast 
resources be mobilized in both the criminal and civil areas of law.  While the 
criminal War on Drugs was blasted on television sets and Internet blogs, the 
civil War on Drugs was waged in the shadows, with the reverberations from 
the bombs felt only by those who lived in war zones.  The War’s armies did 
not only include law enforcement and prosecutors.  They also included 
caseworkers and public housing authorities who were charged with holding 
the line on the civil and administrative fronts.  The interlacing of criminal 
law with civil rules created an inescapable web of seemingly endless 
minefields that inflicted socio-economic violence on targeted groups through 
societal exclusions and denials.  Despite the national trend away from the 
draconian criminal polices of the War on Drugs, Drug War civil sanctions 
continue to render prisoners of the War socially immobile and economically 
precarious, particularly in the context of housing.  
I do not mean to suggest a direct comparison between criminal drug 
laws and federal housing legislation.  Of course, there are many distinctions 
between the two areas of law.  Drug laws and housing regulation trigger two 
very different sets of legal processes, with a different set of constitutional 
rights, and a different set of government expectations.  Violations of drug 
laws occur in the form of a criminal prosecution where the government is an 
adversary, and the defendant has well-established constitutional rights and 
protections during the process.  Violations of federal housing rules, by 
comparison, occur in an administrative context where the government actor 
is first expected to help, and only becomes an adversary when a violation of 
program rules occurs.  Due process is the only constitutional safeguard in 
housing.31  Constitutionally speaking, more is at stake in a drug 
prosecution—an individual’s liberty or life.  In the housing context, what is 
at stake is a government benefit—something an individual is not entitled to 
but is given by way of grant from the government.  Moreover, the costs are 
not exactly parallel.  Despite differences, Drug War critiques in the criminal 
context offer a set of tools to use in analyzing wartime policies in other 
substantive areas of law, such as here in the context of housing.  
II. THE WAR 
 
“All warfare is based on deception.” 
 
 31. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (explaining “that when welfare is 
discontinued, only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due 
process”). 
  




The War on Drugs is sometimes compared to the Vietnam War.33  Like 
Vietnam, America made war, expended thousands of troops, spent millions, 
and lost.34  The drug trafficking jungle was foreign territory where enemy 
troops engaged in guerilla warfare.  And, as with Vietnam, the United States 
withdrew from the conflict economically bruised, domestically battered, and 
internationally embarrassed. 
A. Criminal Policy 
 
“They just tryin’ to jail and chain me, CCA tryin’ to trade me.” 
– Derek Minor featuring Tony Tillman & Thi’sl35 
 
The War on Drugs directly targeted “drugs”—possession, use, sale, 
manufacture, distribution, and trafficking.  The initial objective of drug 
policy focused on substantive criminal law and procedure, including the 
creation of new drug crimes,36 new and longer criminal sentences for drug 
offenses,37 and recidivist statutes that concentrated on prior drug crimes.38  
1. Legislation 
In 1971, President Richard Nixon proclaimed drug abuse “public enemy 
number one” and declared a “[W]ar on [D]rugs.”39  Despite the brief reprieve 
during the administrations of Presidents Ford and Carter,40 President Reagan 
continued the War in the 1980s with a rejuvenated commitment to 
 
 32. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 6 (Lionel Giles trans., Luzac & Co. 1910). 
 33. Then-Senator Joe Biden also compared the War on Drugs to the Vietnam War.  See W. 
John Moore, “Ducking the Truth at Home,” NAT’L J., Sept. 16, 1998, at 2291. 
 34. Id. 
 35. DEREK MINOR, TONY TILLMAN & THI’SL, God Bless the Trap, on THE TRAP (Reach 
Records 2018).   
 36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 960(b).  
 37. Id. § 841(b); Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the 
Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2534 (2010); 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 21 U.S.C.); DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN MCCURDY, CRACKS IN 
THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE LAW, AM. C.L. UNION 
11 (2006), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_20061025.pdf. 
 38. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37. 
 39. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War: A Chronology, supra note 2.  
 40. David Schultz, Rethinking Drug Criminalization Policies, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151, 165 
(1993). 
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eliminating the twin enemies of drug addiction and drug trafficking.41  In 
total, the War was fought for almost four decades 42 and, irrespective of 
partisan affiliation, every president has engaged in the War in some form or 
another.43  To date, the War accomplished nothing; drug use and trafficking 
have remained constant since the 1970s.44 
Three major pieces of anti-drug legislation were enacted during 
Reagan’s presidency that formed the bedrock of the War on Drugs criminal 
policy: (1) the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which included 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,45 (2) the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,46 
and (3) the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.47  The legislation was 
meant to reduce drug abuse and trafficking,48 with the underlying justification 
being the protection of society and the individual.49  But while the legislation 
was being drafted, “debated,” and enacted, the data indicated that drug use 
peaked in the 1970s and decreased steadily through 1984.50  Public officials 
and scholars alike were well aware of this decline when the War started,51 
and later a 1988 Pentagon report concluded that, “[i]ncreased drug 
interdiction efforts [were] not likely to greatly affect the availability of 
cocaine in the United States.”52  Despite this information, the War raged on 
and continued through the 2000s. 
1.1. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, enacted on October 12, 
1984 with an eleventh hour Congressional move to overhaul the federal code, 
 
 41. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 266 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 42. Am. Judicature Soc’y., supra note 2, at 83. 
 43. ROBINSON & SCHERLEN, supra note 3, at 28.  
 44. Claire Suddath, Brief History: The War on Drugs, TIME (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html.  
 45. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 46. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 21 U.S.C.). 
 47. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37. 
 48. Tonry, supra note 3, at 26. 
 49. Bandow, supra note 3, at 244. 
 50. 132 CONG. REC. S26441 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Daniel J. Evans); 
BUREAU JUST. STATS., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—1993, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
457 (1993); Tonry, supra note 3, at 26, 36 (citing OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY 
(“ONDCP”), PRICE AND PURITY OF COCAINE 29 (1992)).  See also Tonry, supra note 3, at 36.  
 51. Tonry, supra note 3, at 36. 
 52. PETER REUTER, GORDON CRAWFORD & JOHNATHAN CAVE, SEALING THE BORDERS: THE 
EFFECTS OF INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION, RAND xi (1988). 
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was the first major piece of anti-drug legislation.53  The Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984,54 a major component of the new legislation, was one of the most 
prominent features of the new legislation—and it was harsh and pervasive.55  
The engineer of this new legislation was also its primary beneficiary: the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).56  
The Act made a number of changes to the federal code.  It created new 
federal penalties for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute and distribution within 1,000 feet of a school zone,57 as well as 
importation.58  The U.S. Parole Commission and the federal parole system 
were also abolished.59  
Congress statutorily authorized the use of civil forfeiture, allowing the 
government to “seize” and liquidate private property that was involved in or 
related to drug trafficking with the purpose of eliminating the profits of drug 
traffickers.60  Prior to the enactment of the Crime Control Act, Title 21 
authorized the use of civil forfeiture of real property, including leasehold 
interests, when that property was used to commit or facilitate criminal 
offenses.61  The Act amended Title 21 to specifically and explicitly authorize 
the civil forfeiture of property used to facilitate drug transactions.62   
 
 53. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 45; John C. Cleary & Alan Ellis, 
An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 31 PRAC. LAW. 31, 31–32 (1985). 
 54. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).  The provision creating the United States Sentencing 
Commission became effective on October 12, 1984.  The United States Sentencing Commission 
was and remains comprised of seven voting members and one nonvoting member.  After consulting 
with law enforcement and defense attorneys and with the approval of the Senate, the President will 
appoint the voting members of the Sentencing Commission, which will serve staggered six-year 
terms. 
 55. Cleary & Ellis, supra note 53, at 32.  
 56. Id. 
 57. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). “” 
 58. Id. §§ 841(b), 960(b). 
 59. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supra note 54, § 218(a)(5) (repealing 18 
U.S.C. §§ 4201–218). 
 60. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, supra note 45, 1837 Stat. at 2047; 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 2040 (codified at 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1961).  With civil forfeiture, the property vests in the United States at the 
time of the crime.  Innocent bona fide purchasers may petition the court for relief.  Forfeiture is 
mandatory upon conviction.   
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (providing for forfeiture of “real property, including any right, title, 
and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land . . . which is 
used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a 
violation”). 
 62. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904).  
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The Act also included a major overhaul to the federal criminal 
sentencing structure.  With the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“Sentencing 
Act”) embedded, the new legislation created the United States Sentencing 
Commission (“Sentencing Commission”), an independent commission 
within the Judicial Branch.63  The Sentencing Commission was mandated to 
draft and file a set of sentencing guidelines (“Guidelines”) by April of 1986.64  
The Guidelines established specific parameters to determine criminal 
sentences in the federal courts and severely restricted the discretion of federal 
sentencing judges.65  
1.2. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“1986 
Act”), which is best known for its crack cocaine provision (alternatively 
known as the 100:1 powder to crack cocaine ratio).  The 1986 Act amended 
the Controlled Substances Act of 197066—the original legislation that 
established federal drug policy and more specifically laid out the controlled 
substances schedules.67  The 1986 Act instructed federal courts to implement 
the 100:1 ratio at sentencing.68  Thus, the same five-year mandatory 
minimum prison sentence was imposed for offenses involving five grams of 
crack or five hundred grams of cocaine.69  The congressional justifications 
supporting the enactment of the ratio included the addictive properties of 
crack, the threat to children and the unborn in utero, as well as the low cost 
of the drug.70  Ironically, as the government intensified law enforcement 
energies, more children became drug dealers, with some suggesting that the 
very “illegality of drugs makes them more attractive to children.” 71  
What has been secreted away is that Congress enacted this legislation 
based in large part on testimony from a well-known and well respected 
District of Columbia prosecutor, Johnny St. Valentine Brown, who was later 
convicted of perjury when a defense attorney exposed that Brown lied about 
 
 63. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supra note 54.  
 64. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1984); Cleary & Ellis, supra note 53, at 36.  
 65. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1984).  With this, the Sentencing Commission directed that there be no 
more than a twenty-five percent difference between the minimum and maximum criminal sentence 
for a particular offense.  Only fifteen percent of the total incarceration term was allowed for “good 
time” credits and industrial credits were eliminated.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).  
 66. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, supra note 62; id. § 202 (providing the controlled 
substances schedules).  
 67. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, supra note 46. 
 68. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006); Beaver, supra note 37, at 2533. 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006); Beaver, supra note 37, at 2533. 
 70. VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 37, at 2. 
 71. Bandow, supra note 3, at 248 (emphasis omitted). 
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his “expert” credentials.72  Based on his “independent research,” Brown 
testified before Congress that, “possession of twenty grams of crack cocaine 
was just as dangerous as having one thousand grams of powder cocaine.”73  
Enter the 100:1 ratio74 and exit Brown.  After twenty years of testifying in 
various trials, Brown was indicted on perjury charges, pled guilty, and was 
sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment.75 
The 1986 Act further authorized enormous federal expenditures with 
$1.1 billion allocated to law enforcement agencies.76  Substance abuse 
treatment was assigned $675 million for recovery programs.77  Prevention 
initiatives were given $80 million.78  The budget demonstrated that the 
federal government was more dedicated to investigation, indictment, and 
incarceration and less committed to preventing and treating the disease of 
addiction.  By the end of President Reagan’s tenure, only 3% of the 
population regarded drug use as the most important problem the country was 
facing.79 
1.3. The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
The final piece of legislation was the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 (“1988 Act”).80  The 1988 Act formulated the policy for a drug free 
America and created the Office of Drug Control Policy.81  The White House 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (“ONDCP”) stressed that law 
enforcement efforts should be given primary import and every year insisted 
that there be a 70-30 split of federal funding in favor of law enforcement.82  
By the time drug czar Bill Bennett was appointed by President George H.W. 
Bush in 1989, federal expenditures for “consequences and confrontation” 
 
 72. Beaver, supra note 37, at, 2533–34. 
 73. Id. at 2534 (citing Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws—The Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 166–73 (2007) (statement of 
Eric. E. Sterling, President, Crim. Just. Pol’y Found.)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Bill Miller, Challenges Planned After ‘Expert’ Resigns, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 
1999, at B2). 
 76. Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Law: Words, Deed, Political Expediency, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 
1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/27/us/anti-drug-law-words-deeds-political-expediency 
.html. 
 77. 132 CONG. REC. S26461 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Broyhill). 
 78. Id. at 26451–52 (statement of Sen. Abdnor). 
 79. Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in American 
Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425, 425 (1994). 
 80. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37; VAGINS & MCCURDY, supra note 37. 
 81. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 1002. 
 82. Tonry, supra note 3, at 25 (citing ONDCP 1990 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY—
BUDGET SUMMARY 100 (1990)). 
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was $12 billion.83  A chunk of this was spent on high-priced weaponry 
including fighter jets and Navy submarines.84  With its laser focus on law 
enforcement, ONDCP consistently snubbed the treatment approach even 
though it was “known that tens of thousands of drug users in cities wanted 
but could not gain admission to treatment programs.”85  In addition, Congress 
appropriated $200 million to build and equip new prison facilities so as “to 
alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons and to meet the increased demand 
for prison space resulting from drug-related offenses.”86  In the first ten years 
of its life, ONDCP failed to achieve drug war goals with studies 
demonstrating that expenditures outweighed any realized benefits.87 
Perhaps more importantly, the 1988 Act mounted a further aggressive 
assault against crack offenders.88  The legislation established a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of five years for simple possession of five 
grams or more of crack.89  The maximum penalty was set at a twenty-year 
term.  In contrast, the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for all other 
drugs was one year.90  Moreover, the 1988 Act authorized a term of life 
imprisonment for a three-time recidivist drug offender.91  Individuals with 
two or more prior felony drug convictions were statutorily required to serve 
life imprisonment without the possibility of release.92  Now, repeat drug 
offenders could be held prisoner forever—literally.   
Finally, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 revisited civil forfeiture and 
once again amended Title 21 to clarify that real property seized in connection 
with facilitating a drug transaction included leasehold interests.93  This statute 
remains in effect.  With this, civil forfeiture fell into three main categories: 
(1) the drugs may be forfeited, (2) the money or tangibles purchased with 
drug money may be forfeited, and (3) the real property and leasehold interests 
that are used in commission of the offense may be forfeited.94  The 
 
 83. Am. Judicature Soc’y., supra note 2, at 48, 83. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Tonry, supra note 3, at 25. 
 86. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 6157. 
 87. ROBINSON & SCHERLEN, supra note 3, at 202. 
 88. Brinkley, supra note 76.  
 89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 6371. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. § 6452. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. § 5104 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)). 
 94. Kevin Cole, Civilizing Civil Forfeiture, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 249, 250 (1996).  See, 
e.g., Pamela Brown, Parents’ house seized after son’s drug bust, CNN (September 8, 2014, 10:45 
AM) (detailing a situation where parents, never convicted of a crime, were forced out of their home 
in Philadelphia based on their son’s criminal drug charges (for having $40 worth of heroin) and 
highlighting that over 500 homes and cars in Philadelphia were seized in a two-year period in 
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government is authorized to seize the property if issued a warrant pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which requires an ex parte judicial 
determination of probable cause.95  Law enforcement is thus permitted to 
seize assets and property from people who are not criminally prosecuted if 
the property itself is suspected of involvement in criminal activity.96  This 
occurs even if the property owner is not charged with the predicate offense.97  
Moreover, there are no particular procedural rules governing the process.98  
The use of civil forfeiture, as a practice in criminal prosecutions, 
evolved into a substantial component of drug enforcement strategy in the late 
1990s.99  Property was “seized and sold with the profits flowing to law 
enforcement budgets.”100  The War integrated the confiscation of homes, 
including those of innocent people accused of having a substance-abusing 
relative.101  Between September 2001 and September 2014, the DOJ’s 
equitable sharing program was responsible for nearly 62,000 seizures of cash 
without warrants or criminal indictments filed against owners.  Of the $2.5 
billion forfeited as a result, state and local agencies received $1.7 billion and 
federal agencies received $800 million.102  Aside from the arbitrariness of 
civil forfeiture, the deeper issue was and continues to be that the process 
incentivizes the practice without any accountability or oversight.103  With the 
legal action considered “civil,” claimants are without a constitutional right to 





 95. United States v. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
 96. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881; Rishi Batra, Resolving Civil Forfeiture Disputes, 66 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 399, 401 (2017). 
 97. Batra, supra note 96. 
 98. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 507. 
 99. Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 889, 889–94 (1987). 
 100. Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839, 842–43 
(2002) (citing William Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable 
Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 
80 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1309–13 (1992)). 
 101. United States v. $46,588.00 in U.S. Currency and $20.00 in Canadian Currency, 103 F.3d 
902, 903 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 102. Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and Seize: 
Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-
and-seize/.  The DOJ’s program permits local enforcement to share in the proceeds of property 
seized through civil forfeiture.  
 103. Boyd, supra note 100. 
 104. Batra, supra note 96, at 412–13. 
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The War on Drugs overhaul to the federal criminal code culminated in 
a “no mercy” criminal justice policy for drug offenders—and only drug 
offenders.  Hard-hitting law enforcement efforts were statutorily authorized 
not to just investigate suspected drug offenders, but to hunt them, especially 
if they were suspected crack offenders.  Backed by billions of dollars in 
federal funding and resources, law enforcement officers attacked entire 
communities and social networks in search of the wicked drug offender.  
Despite studies reporting a decline in drug abuse and the ineffectiveness of 
supply-side enforcement, Congress continued its focus on drugs and drug 
offenders.105  The law also placed federal judges in a sentencing straitjacket, 
providing little wiggle room to make appropriate adjustments where fairness 
and justice would otherwise require.  The War on Drugs policies, coupled 
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, stripped judges of sufficient 
discretion to consider individual circumstances when sentencing federal 
defendants.  With this, long and often unnecessary terms of imprisonment 
were imposed.   
2. Repercussions  
The War’s anti-drug criminal legislation offered, in vain, billions of 
dollars to support federal and state efforts to eradicate drugs.  The supply-
side approach, with its emphasis on aggressive drug enforcement, may have 
actually produced more social damage and violence than it helped.106  With 
2.2 million people in the nation’s prisons and jails, a 500% increase over the 
last forty years, the United States was named the world’s top jailer in 2009—
imprisoning the greatest proportion of its population relative to every other 
country in the world.107  Moreover, by 2011, approximately 6.98 million 
people in the United States were serving a term of federal or state correctional 
supervision.108  Despite the recent decline in U.S. rates of imprisonment, 
incarceration rates are not slated to decline to 1980 levels for almost ninety 
years.109  The War on Drugs was a legislative design meant to increase the 
 
 105. Supply-side enforcement focuses on the drug supply by targeting the sources of supply 
(manufacturers, distributors, suppliers), compared to demand-side policies, which focus on the 
demand for the drugs by targeting addiction and treatment services. 
 106. Batra, supra note 96, at 412–13. 
 107. FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 1, 2; E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, 
BUREAU JUST. STATS. 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
 108. Lauren E. Glaze & Erika Parks, Correctional Populations in the United States, 2011, 
BUREAU JUST. STATS. 1 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf. 
 109. Marc Mauer & Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can We Wait 88 Years to End Mass Incarceration? 
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/88-years-mass-
incarceration_b_4474132.   
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power of the prosecutor and reduce the discretion of the courts.  The result 
was a system of over-prosecution and mass incarceration.   
Prosecutorial power over the criminal process grew during the War on 
Drugs, along with a 160% increase of people arrested for drug crimes 
between 1980 and 1989.110  Mandatory minimums greatly expanded 
prosecutorial influence, thus changing the balance of power in drug 
prosecutions.111  Plea bargains could be all but forced upon defendants.112  
With the threat of sentencing enhancements based on recidivist offender 
designations (such as armed career criminal) possibly resulting in a life 
sentence,113 a plea was all but guaranteed.114  Between 1980 and 1996, there 
was almost a tenfold increase in drug convictions nationwide.115  In the 
federal system, there was almost a twentyfold increase of offenders 
imprisoned for drug offenses between 1980 and 2007.116  The War on Drugs 
more than doubled the American prison population between 1981 and 
1990.117  In 1996, the prison population tripled, with research suggesting this 
was both due to a greater proclivity to arrest and the practice of imposing 
longer prison sentences.118  By 1997, 60% of federal prisoners were drug 
offenders.119 
The courts offered little relief to criminal defendants challenging the 
power of the drug enforcement machine.  With the statutorily-sanctioned 
expansion of police power and increased prosecutorial control over the 
criminal process, the courts provided little constitutional cover for drug 
defendants.  Instead, drug policy seemed to dictate not only criminal law and 
 
 110. Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 288–89 (2010).   
 111. Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an 
Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 137–38 (1995). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); T.J. Matthes, The Armed Career Criminal Act: A Severe Implication 
Without Explanation, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 591, 592–94 (2015).  
 114. Morvillo & Bohrer, supra note 111, at 137–38. 
 115. Fareed Zakaria, Incarceration Nation: The war on drugs has succeeded only in putting 
millions of Americans in jail, TIME (Apr. 2, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,2109777,00.html. 
 116. See Sentencing Memorandum of Myles Haynes at 10, United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 
2d 200 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 06-10328), 2006 WL 5283198, at *10. 
 117. Number of Inmates in U.S. Reaches Record, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1990), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/08/us/number-of-inmates-in-us-reaches-record.html (reporting 
a jump from 344,283 inmates in 1981 to 755,425 inmates in 1990). 
 118. Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in the U.S. Prisons 1980–1996, in 
PRISONS 17, 43 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds. 1999) (noting the breakdown as follows: 51% 
increase attributed to a proclivity to incarcerate upon arrest and 37% increase attributed to longer 
sentences of imprisonment). 
 119. Lisa Rosenblum, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1217, 1230–31 (2002). 
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procedure but also the parameters of constitutional protections guaranteed to 
the American people.120  Cases granted certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court often pronounced rules departing from longstanding 
interpretations of Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.121  
With the Burger and Rehnquist courts reigning during the height of the War, 
civil rights and freedoms were severely restricted.122  In a series of drug cases, 
the Court gave the police great power and deference.  Law enforcement was 
now constitutionally permitted to search your trash,123 your farm,124 and your 
car125 without a warrant and sometimes without probable cause.  As a 
detection tool, the police could use a drug dog in almost every 
circumstance,126 and warrantless surveillance could be conducted via 
helicopter,127 plane,128 and beeper.129  When criminal defendants levied race-
based challenges, the Court all but looked away.  In Whren v. United 
States,130 the petitioner claimed racial profiling under the Fourth Amendment 
and the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment was the wrong 
 
 120. Id. at 1228; see also Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 121. John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the 
Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 580–82 (1991). 
 122. Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger Is Dead at 87; Was Chief Justice for 17 Years, N.Y. 
TIMES, (June 26, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/26/obituaries/warren-e-burger-is-dead-
at-87-was-chief-justice-for-17-years.html.  
 123. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a discarded trash bag left at the curb for a third-party 
disposal). 
 124. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (establishing a four-pronged test for 
curtilage and finding that a barn, fifty yards from the fence that enclosed the home, did not constitute 
curtilage for Fourth Amendment purposes); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding 
that there is no expectation of privacy in open fields). 
 125. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that where the police have 
probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband, police may search the containers in an 
automobile without a warrant).  
 126. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983) (holding that a canine sniff of the exterior 
of a luggage bad did not constitute a search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding 
that a canine sniff of a car during a lawful traffic stop, without a warrant, did not constitute a search). 
 127. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy 
in the warrantless observation by law enforcement that occurred in a helicopter flying at 400 feet 
by naked-eye observation and in a physically nonintrusive manner). 
 128. California v. Ciarolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that there is no expectation of 
privacy in the warrantless observation by law enforcement that occurred in an airplane in public 
navigable airspace by naked-eye observation and in a physically nonintrusive manner). 
 129. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that the warrantless monitoring 
of an individual’s movements with an electronic beeper was not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (holding that the warrantless 
monitoring of an individual’s movements with an electronic beeper was not a search). 
 130. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
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constitutional vehicle to allege race-based complaints.131  Instead, petitioners 
would have to make an equal protection claim.132  When a race-based claim 
of selective prosecution was made in United States v. Armstrong,133 the Court 
crafted an insurmountable test to make such a showing.134  In handing down 
these opinions, the Court pushed the War agenda forward, thus giving the 
drug enforcement machine the green light to continue to attack and wreak 
havoc on communities of color. 
The repercussions of wartime criminal policy on targeted groups are 
vast, however drug war critics focus primarily on three categories of costs: 
(1) financial expenditures, (2) social disruption, and (3) race-based targeting.  
In accordance with wartime legislation, drug enforcement efforts were fully 
funded.  As mentioned above, Congress allocated billions of dollars annually 
to law enforcement agencies in its effort to combat drug use and trafficking.  
By 1991, federal expenditures were at $10.5 billion, a 64% increase since the 
presidential administration of George H.W. Bush began in 1989.135  Requests 
for funding continued to increase, with appeals for additional funding in 1992 
coming in at $11.7 billion.136  In addition to financial expenditures, Congress 
authorized the transfer of excess military equipment to state and local law 
enforcement agencies.137  And if the resources allocated were not enough, 
drug-related civil forfeiture actions offered an additional pool of funding.  
Armed with military-grade equipment and seemingly unlimited financial 
resources, the drug enforcement machine was able to launch a Spartan attack.   
Corrections expenditures also skyrocketed.  Between 1982 and 2001, 
state corrections expenditures increased annually from $15 billion to $53.5 
billion, and fluctuated between 2002 and 2010.138  The largest allocation of 
funding between 1982 and 2010 was for institutions, including prisons and 
work release facilities.139  During this time, the operational expenditures per 
 
 131. Id. at 813.  
 132. Id.  
 133. 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
 134. Id. at 458.  The Court required a high standard of proof to establish a prima facie showing 
entitling a defendant to discovery on the issue of selective prosecution.  The test required a defendant 
make a “threshold showing . . . that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated 
suspects of other races.”  Id.  
 135. DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 329–30 (Steven R. 
Belenko ed., 2000) [hereinafter DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Keep off the Grass: The 
Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy, 91 OR. L. REV. 1069, 1087 (2013); see also 
RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE 
FORCES 242–308 (2013). 
 138. Tracey Kyckelhahn, State Corrections Expenditures, FY 1982–2010, BUREAU JUST. 
STATS., 1 (last updated Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy8210.pdf. 
 139. Id.  
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inmate in a state or private prison at the 25th percentile was between $21,243 
and $26,452, and between $37,084 and $43,178 at the 75th percentile.140  
However, expenditures started to dip under $30,000 per inmate annually 
around 2004 and continue to decline.141  Parole, probation, nonresidential 
halfway houses, and costs associated with administration (considered 
noninstitutional corrections) comprised 20.4% and 27.3% of total corrections 
outlays and ranged from $3.8 billion to $12.9 billion.142 
The social costs associated with the incarceration aspect of the War are 
substantial.143 Mass incarceration disrupts the social order144 and destabilizes 
communities.145  Such harms include family interruption, diminished socio-
economic status, disenfranchisement, and increased risk of recidivism.146  
Poverty and lack of opportunity are associated with higher crime rates; 
crime leads to arrest, a criminal record, and usually a jail or prison sentence; 
a history of past crimes lengthens those sentences; offenders released from 
prison or jail confront family and neighborhood dysfunction, increased risks 
of unemployment, and other-producing disadvantages; this makes them 
likelier to commit new crimes, and the cycle repeats itself.147 
High rates of imprisonment are geographically clustered in “hot spots” 
that are predicted by social factors correlated to urban disadvantage—
poverty, unemployment, family disruption, and racial seclusion.148  These 
communities overwhelmingly bear the burdens associated with 
imprisonment and are not safer, with data suggesting a “tipping point when 
incarceration becomes so heavily concentrated in disadvantaged 
communities that it works against the safety and well-being of that 
community.”149  Sociological studies report that these communities are 
 
 140. Id. at 5. 
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 145. Id. at 1282; Todd R. Clear, The Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”: The Prison-Crime 
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CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181, 183 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 
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 146. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 439 (2013). 
 147. Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s 
Prison and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009). 
 148. Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place: The Local Concentration of 
Mass Incarceration, 139 DAEDALUS 20, 21–22 (2010). 
 149. Traum, supra note 146, at 435.  
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considerably damaged when those released from prison return with reduced 
political, economic, and social opportunities and status.150 
The racial impact of the War is very real and shown by the statistics.  
Arrest rates exploded, with minority populations bearing the brunt of the drug 
policies.151  Between 1980 and 2009, the Black arrest rate rose 205% while 
the white arrest rate increased 102%. 152  More specifically, arrest rates for 
sale and/or manufacture for Black individuals rose 363% between 1980 and 
1989, while the arrest rates for white individuals increased 127%. 153  The 
incarceration rate tells a similar story.  More than 60% of the imprisoned 
population is comprised of people of color.154  Black men are six times and 
Hispanic men are 2.7 times more likely than their white counterparts to be 
incarcerated.155  On any given day, approximately one in every twelve Black 
men in his thirties is incarcerated. 156  America, the land of the free, is 
imprisoning “the same number of African-American men as were enslaved 
in 1820.”157  For many Black men, the risk of incarceration is a normal event 
in one’s life.158  
The researched explanation for the racial impact is also disheartening, 
with scholars concluding that the War was partially inspired by racism.159  In 
2010, James Unnever and Francis Cullen reported the “prominent reason” for 
the harshness of the United States justice system “is the belief that those 
disproportionately subject to these harsh sanctions are people they do not 
like: African American offenders.”160  The very architecture of wartime 
 
 150. Id. at 434–35 (“While one family can bear the strain of a family member’s imprisonment 
by relying on ‘networks of kin and friends,’ multiple families relying on the same network 
eventually strain and weaken the community.”) (citing Roberts, supra note 144, at 1282). 
 151. See DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 135, at 334. 
 152. Snyder, supra note 110 at 13 (referencing Figure 40). 
 153. Id. (referencing Figure 44).  
 154. FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 5. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Boyd, supra note 100, at 846 (citing Jan M. Chaiken, Crunching Numbers: Crime and 
Incarceration at the End of the Millennium, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., 14 (2000)). 
 158. Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW 
YORKER 72 (Jan. 22, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-caging-of-
america.  See also Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass 
Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 231 (2009) (finding that one in eight 
Black men in their twenties is in prison or jail on any given day, and 69% of Black high school 
dropouts are imprisoned over their lifetime, compared with just 15% for white high school 
dropouts).  
 159. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE 
REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 51–52 (2014); James D. Unnever & 
Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americas’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing 
Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 119 (2010). 
 160. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 159, at 119. 
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policy suggests race-based policies.  Take, for example, the crack-to-powder 
ratio.161  Crack, a drug associated with poor Black people, was punished 100 
times more harshly than powder cocaine, a drug associated with wealthy 
white people.162  With this, Congress made a deliberate choice to punish 
Black defendants more harshly than white defendants.163  Critics lament that 
the War’s legislation, meant to eradicate drug abuse and trafficking, was used 
to control communities of color by removing the target: the men.164  The 
wartime machine targeted, arrested, and imprisoned disproportionate 
numbers of Black and Latino men.  The statistics bear out an incorrigible 
reality: the War on Drugs resulted in the creation of a separate 
“demographically distinct underclass” comprised primarily of men of color 
now excludable from mainstream society based on the drug felon label.165  
This societal exclusion has thus left this demographic vulnerable to the War’s 
continued violence in the civil and administrative spheres. 
The War on Drugs was a miserable failure.  The strategy—attacking the 
supply side of the drug problem—was doomed from the start.  The success 
rate of drug seizures at both the state and federal levels has remained constant 
since the 1960s—10%.166  Despite the billions of dollars expended, the War 
did nothing to slow the flow of illegal narcotics in and around the United 
States.167  The “replacement effect,” where imprisoned drug dealers are 
replaced by others willing to assume the risk, proved to be a major 
impediment to the supply-side tactic.168  Imprisoning “foot soldiers and drug 
users in gangs has a negligible impact on crime,”169 particularly on drug use 
and associated violence.170  In the end, the War on Drugs accomplished 
neither of its twin objectives of combatting drug abuse and ending drug 
trafficking.171   
 
 161. Levin, supra note 26, at 2181. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 2183–84.  
 165. Id. at 2180. 
 166. See Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 292 (2015) (citing 
Harry Hermans, War on Drugs, DRUG TEXT (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.drugtest.org/International-
national-drug-policy/war-on-drugs.html). 
 167. Id. at 273.  
 168. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 19 
(2009), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_ 
32609.pdf; David W. Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 
30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 698 (2003); Tonry, supra note 3, at 26. 
 169. Baradaran, supra note 166, at 294 (citing Rasmussen & Benson, supra note 168, at 705). 
 170. Tracey L. Meares, It’s a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 587–89 (1997). 
 171. David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 36 
(2011). 
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As the War on Drugs policies and practices swept across state criminal 
codes, other areas of law were reviewed, amended, and modified to reflect 
the anti-drug sentiment that captured the country.  Drug policy crept into a 
number of state and federal statutes and regulations on employment, public 
benefit eligibility, and housing policy.  The collateral consequences of being 
a prisoner of war was that you continued to be a target in the shadows where 
the War was being waged on the civil side.172  
  
 
 172. Travis, supra note 16, at 15–19; see also Chin, supra note 16, at 1790–92.  
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B. Housing Policy 
 
“Cops patrol projects 
Hatin’ the people livin’ in ‘em  
I was born an inmate 
Waitin’ to escape the prison” 
– Tupac & The Outlawz173  
 
The extension of Drug War policy into civil and administrative law, 
dubbed the “New Jim Crow” by Michelle Alexander174 and the “New Civil 
Death” by Gabriel Chin,175 continued the War’s devastation on poor 
communities of color.  The marriage of criminal drug policy with welfare 
during the War led to the expansion of legislatively demarcated war zones.176  
Beginning with Ronald Reagan, public assistance recipients were added to 
the list of targeted groups that eventually culminated in an all-out assault on 
poor minority communities.177  In the context of housing, the War was 
particularly destructive, as it took more prisoners than just the individual 
offender.  In crafting wartime strategy, policymakers took specific aim at 
poor housing communities, thus capturing a secondary group of prisoners in 
the drug enforcement net: the family, friends, and associates of those 
suspected of drug-related criminal activity.  Housing subsidy recipients were 
targeted and criminalized.178 
1. Legislation 
To relieve the nation’s housing pressures and ensure “safe and 
affordable housing” during the Great Depression, the federal government 
intervened in the name of promoting the “general welfare.”179  With this, 
 
 173. TUPAC & THE OUTLAWZ, Black Jesuz, on STILL I RISE (Death Row Records 1999).  
 174. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
 175. Chin, supra note 16.  
 176. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.  
 177. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.  
 178. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1564.  
 179. Alex Markels, Comparing Today’s Housing Crisis with the 1930s: Home prices have fallen 
and construction stalled, but the Great Depression was twice as bad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT. 
(Feb. 28, 2008), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/real-
estate/articles/2008/02/28/comparing-todays-housing-crisis-with-the-1930s.  This includes The 
National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 84–345, 48 Stat. 847, enacted June 28, 1934, also called 
the Capehart Act, and the United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888, 
enacted September 1, 1937.  “[T]he goal of providing decent and affordable housing for all citizens 
through the efforts and encouragement of Federal, State, and local governments, and by the 
independent and collective actions of private citizens, organizations, and the private sector.”  42 
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federal housing policy evolved into a system of federal subsidization.180  It 
has since mutated from public housing to private market vouchers to an 
underfunded program with millions of federally subsidized units 
disappearing from the housing market.181 
The War on Drugs’ influence on federal housing policy resulted in the 
targeting of “drugs” in both admission and termination rules and procedure.  
Taken together, four pieces of legislation form the basis of the War’s anti-
drug policy in housing: (1) the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,182 (2) the 
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990,183 (3) the Housing Opportunity 
Program Extension Act of 1996,184 and (4) the Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998.185  Despite the second chance revolution 
occurring in the criminal law context, federal housing policy remains 
entrenched in the strict exclusionary policies of the War.   
The seeds that fused criminal drug policy with welfare reform were in 
the public imagination early in the War.  But the foundation for this 
amalgamation was laid in the public consciousness generations prior and was 
woven throughout our nation’s history.  From the early days of the republic, 
crime and race have been definitively linked in the American psyche.186  In 
the 1970s, a third prong gradually developed that merged welfare 
dependency with race and crime. 
 
U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4).  This principle was reiterated in the 1990 Gonzalez National Affordable 
Housing Act.  The Act stated that the housing goals of America continue to be committed “to decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing for every American.”  Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 503, 104 Stat. 4079, 4085.  
 180. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  “[T]he goal of providing decent and affordable housing for all 
citizens through the efforts and encouragement of Federal, State, and local governments, and by the 
independent and collective actions of private citizens, organizations, and the private sector.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1437(a)(4).  This principle was reiterated in the 1990 Gonzalez National Affordable 
Housing Act.  The Act stated that the housing goals of America continue to be committed “to decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing for every American.”  Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing 
Act of 1990, supra note 179, § 503. 
 181. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (creating the “Section 8 Housing Certificate 
program” in 1974, which was the precursor to the current “Housing Choice Voucher Program” 
(“HCV”)); JENNIFER WOLCH, MICHAEL DEAR, GARY BLASI, DAN FLAMING, PAUL TEPPER, PAUL 
KOEGEL & DANIEL WARSHAWSKY, ENDING HOMELESSNESS IN LOS ANGELES 6 (2007). 
 182. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37.  
 183. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, supra note 179. 
 184. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).  
 185. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461, Title V (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 186. PUBLIC HOUSING MYTHS: PERCEPTION, REALITY, AND SOCIAL POLICY 64–65 (Nicholas 
Dagen Bloom, Fritz Umbach & Lawrence J. Vale eds., 2015).   
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In the 1960s and 1970s, sociologists studying then existing social 
policies, such as William Julius Wilson, wrote about the swelling of “the 
underclass.”187  Wilson defined the underclass as “the most disadvantaged 
segment[] of the black urban community.”188  He further described this group 
as,  
individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-
term unemployment or are not members of the labor force, 
individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of 
aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of 
poverty and/or welfare dependency.189  
The unification of race, crime, and welfare in the sociological literature 
supported a conservative political agenda with evidence steeped in the 
behavioral sciences.  To add fuel, the sociopolitical climate was becoming 
saturated with reactionary calls to civil rights progress.  With this, welfare 
and federal housing programs became a natural focal point during the War.  
The presidential administrations of the 1980s and 1990s capitalized on this 
trifecta for campaign points and policy initiatives. 
In his 1980 bid for president, Ronald Reagan relentlessly condemned 
two targets: drug offenders and so-called welfare queens.190  Reagan’s 
“welfare queen” provided the perfect propaganda to demonize and 
criminalize the welfare system.  The welfare queen, characterized as a poor 
Black woman “working” the welfare system, walked hand-in-hand with the 
drug addict and street dealer.  The welfare queen was the mother, sister, 
grandmother, wife, or girlfriend of the drug offender.  The political narrative 
painted a picture that linked the two groups as threats to the social order.  
While the drug offender threatened to morally bankrupt the American people 
with trafficking and addiction, the welfare queen threatened to financially 
bankrupt the American budget by cheating taxpayers through welfare 
fraud.191  Poor women, especially Black women, were classified as criminals.  
This criminalization was generated through the stereotype of the welfare 
queen as a lazy fraudster who refused to work.192  Just as important, the 
welfare queen was seen as an “incubator[] of criminal activity”—through her 
children.193  She decided to have more and more children out of wedlock to 
 
 187. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2d ed. 2012). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id.  
 190. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 643, 
650–51 (2009); Ocen, supra note 30, at 1562. 
 193. Ocen, supra note 30, at 1562. 
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increase her public benefits, as opposed to working and getting married.194  
Americans viewed welfare as a Black program that rewarded laziness.195  
Both groups were thus presented as public enemies deserving of tough 
punishments. 
1.1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
The manifestation of this political sentiment was first statutorily 
expressed in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which was an important 
amendment to the existing United States Housing Act of 1937.196  The last 
major piece of federal anti-drug criminal legislation, the 1988 Act started the 
spillover of the War’s policies into the housing realm.  The first shots in the 
anti-drug offensive on national housing policy were fired.   
In the 1988 Act, Congress made a number of findings, including that 
drug dealers were “imposing a reign of terror” on federal housing program 
tenants and that drug-related crime was “rampant” in federal housing 
projects, leading to violence.197  In furthering laying the groundwork, 
Congress created a clearinghouse on drug abuse in public housing and 
training programs for public housing officials confronting drugs on their 
property.198  The congressional findings declared war on drug dealers 
utilizing federal housing programs.  The clearinghouse served as the center 
for drug related intelligence.  And the training programs provided a planning 
stage to craft strategies from which to launch an assault.   
In terms of tenancies, drug-related criminal activity was made a federal 
statutory basis for termination from public housing.  With Congressional 
findings that drug crimes were “rampant” in public housing projects, the 
focus of this amendment was the eradication of drugs from federal housing 
programs.199  Public housing tenants, or other persons under the tenants’ 
control suspected of “drug-related criminal activity, on or near” a public 
 
 194. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30.  
 195. MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF 
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 3, 60–61 (1993). 
 196. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5101 (amending the United States Housing 
Act of 1937). 
 197. Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 5122, 102 Stat. 4181, 
4301 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11901); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing 
Act of 1990, supra note 179, § 581(a); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra 
note 185, § 586(b).  
 198. Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, supra note 197, §5143(a) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11922); 42 U.S.C. Ch. §§ 11901–11925; H.R. Res. 4483, 100th Cong. 
(1988). 
 199. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5101. 
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housing project, could be terminated from the program.200  Any suspicion of 
drugs and the household was out.  Moreover, leasehold interests were now 
considered subject to civil forfeiture, allowing the government to take 
possession of federally-subsidized housing units premises.201 
The 1988 Act also authorized the Public Housing Drug Elimination 
Program (“PHDEP”) as a pilot program meant to eradicate drug-related 
activity in federally-subsidized housing.202  The goals of the program 
included the eradication of drug-related crimes on or near public housing 
projects, the development of strategies to address drug activities by Public 
Housing Agencies (“PHAs”), and funding to effectuate these tactics.203  With 
this, five key strategy topics evolved: (1) law enforcement/security, (2) 
physical improvements, (3) drug treatment, (4) drug prevention, and (5) 
Resident Council programs.204  Federal funding for enforcement was also 
provided through an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, authorizing the Bureau of Justice Assistance to issue 
block grants to housing programs confronting drug trafficking.205 
President Reagan also successfully struck at legal services for the 
poor.206  Legal services provide free civil legal representation to the poor, 
including to federal housing assistance recipients.207  In his first term, Reagan 
attempted to completely eliminate the congressional budget for the Legal 
Services Corporation.208  After encountering opposition, he settled for 
cutbacks.209  The cutback in federal funding left legal aid offices resource-
starved and unable to serve clients adequately.210  During his tenure, Reagan 
also plugged the engine of the 1960s/1970s welfare rights movement: legal 
 
 200. Id.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(b)(1)(i); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(c)(1) (“The lease must 
provide that drug-related criminal activity engaged in, on or near the premises by any tenant, 
household member, or guest, or such activity engaged in on the premises by any other person under 
the tenant’s control, is grounds for the owner to terminate tenancy.”) (emphasis added).  
 201. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5105 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3751). 
 202. U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM 
RESOURCE DOCUMENT: FINAL REPORT (1994), https://www.huduser.gov/portal//Publications/pdf/ 
HUD-006464.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING FINAL REPORT]. 
 203. Id. at i–iv.  
 204. Id. at ii. 
 205. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 37, § 5104 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3751). 
 206. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 37. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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aid lawyers were now forbidden to file class action lawsuits against the 
government, state and federal.211   
1.2. The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 
During the presidential administration of George H.W. Bush, HUD 
received substantial federal financial support for waging the War in 
subsidized housing.  This began with the enactment of the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990.212  The legislation 
issued directives requiring PHAs to target drug activity with regard to 
program “preference” classifications,213 public housing lease provisions,214 
and eviction procedures.215  The preference classification includes the poorest 
families.216  The Act banned households from the “preference” classification 
for three years if they were evicted from public housing in connection with 
drug-related criminal activity, unless the tenant successfully completed 
rehabilitation programming.217  
Public housing leases were also required to explicitly implement the 
War’s principles.218  PHAs were directed to impose lease provisions 
incorporating the drug-related termination language,219 thereby transforming 
“drug related activity” into an official and contractual program rule violation.  
The legislation further established an “expedited” eviction procedure for 
households allegedly involved in “drug-related criminal activity on or near” 
a public housing project.220  PHAs were statutorily authorized to exclude this 
class of terminations and evictions from the traditional administrative 
grievance process, providing a faster track for a household’s removal.221  
Serving as the HUD Secretary from 1989 to 1993, Jack Kemp executed an 
aggressive multi-faceted attack on subsidized housing.222  Kemp’s strategy 
included utilization of the fast track eviction procedure outlined in the Act, 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, supra note 179.  
 213. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)). 
 214. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5)). 
 215. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)). 
 216. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)). 
 217. Id. § 501 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(4)(A)). 
 218. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5)). 
 219. Id. § 504.  Section 6(1)(5) of the Housing Act of 1937 was amended to read as follows: 
“provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment 
of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises, 
engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other 
person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.”  Id.  
 220. Id. § 503 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)). 
 221. Id.; see also 24 C.F.R.§ 982.51(a)(1)(i)(B). 
 222. Reagan, supra note 21, at 207.   
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terminating households suspected of drug-related activity without an 
administrative hearing.223  
Moreover, it was during George H.W. Bush’s presidency that HUD was 
permitted to award grants to PHAs to train tenant patrols and security 
personnel, employ security, and hire investigators to investigate drug-related 
crime specifically.224  From 1989 to 1993, Congress appropriated over $530 
million to fund the PHDEP program started by Reagan as a pilot program: 
“$8.2 million in FY 1989; $97.4 million in FY 1990; $140.8 million in FY 
1991; $140.6 million in FY 1992; and $145.5 million in FY 1993.”225  Law 
enforcement and security, as a category, was allocated the largest share of 
PHDEP funding,226 which included the hiring of security personnel, 
investigators, and “[a]dditional [s]ecurity and [p]rotective [s]ervices from 
[l]ocal [l]aw [e]nforcement [a]gencies.”227  In reality, PHAs turned to local 
enforcement to provide additional security rather than using private security 
companies.228  PHAs were encouraged to collaborate with local law 
enforcement to seek and destroy drug-related crime in public housing.  The 
tactics employed included information sharing between PHAS and law 
enforcement, no-notice entries into the units of PHA tenants, and public 
housing sweeps.   
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Clinton declared the 
“One Strike and You’re Out” policy, which helped to strengthen termination 
rules in public housing.229  The negative political rhetoric that started during 
Reagan’s administration was legislatively realized during the tenure of 
President Bill Clinton with the decentralization of welfare and 
implementation of conditions and restrictions on public assistance 
recipients.230  As part of his tough on crime stance, he called for PHAs to 
automatically terminate households suspected of engaging in drug-related 
activity and to deny drug offenders admission to PHAs strictly based on 
 
 223. Id. (citing David B. Bryson & Roberta L. Youmans, Crimes, Drugs and Subsidized 
Housing, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 435 (1990)). 
 224. See Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, supra note 197, § 5123 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 11902); Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, 
supra note 179, § 581(a); Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra note 185, 
§ 586(b). 
 225. See PUBLIC HOUSING FINAL REPORT., supra note 202, at i. 
 226. Id. at i-ii (“Law enforcement/security activities received the largest share of funds (47 
percent).  The prevention area received 38 percent; physical improvements, 6 percent; drug 
treatment, 6 percent; and resident initiatives, 4 percent.”). 
 227. Id. at 32. 
 228. Id. at 38. 
 229. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 145, 181. 
 230. Id. at 182. 
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having a past drug conviction.231  President Clinton’s “One Strike” 
proclamation not only culminated in legislation, but it also impelled HUD to 
draft and adopt regulations implementing more stringent exclusionary 
standards.232 
1.3. The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 
The legislation enacted in 1996, the Housing Opportunity Program 
Extension Act of 1996,233 is perhaps the most pernicious of the anti-drug 
housing legislation, as it further expanded the War’s reach to include the 
Section 8 housing certificate and voucher (“HCV”) programs234—the most 
utilized federally-subsidized housing program in the country.235  Legislation 
previously enacted to combat drug crimes in public housing was now applied 
to Section 8 programming.236  In addition, use or addiction to either drugs or 
alcohol, were targeted for termination from both public housing and Section 
8 programming.237  A PHA’s determination of reasonable cause that a tenant 
is engaging in illegal drug or alcohol use was deemed a sufficient basis to 
terminate and evict under the Act.238  Lease provisions were also revisited, 
with termination language amended from “drug-related criminal activity on 
or near the premises”239 to “drug-related criminal activity on or off the 
premises.”240  Suspicion alone, not only criminal convictions, involving drug-
related criminal activity occurring anywhere served as permissible grounds 
for termination from public housing and Section 8.  In addition, Congress 
authorized PHAs to pull criminal records to make admission and eviction 
decisions.241  Thus, the United States Housing Act of 1937 was amended, yet 
again, with wartime policy weaponizing national housing policy to capture 
more prisoners.  The War’s violence was mobilizing bodies not only from 
society to prison but also from federal housing into the abyss of 
homelessness. 
 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, supra note 184, § 1. 
 234. Id. § 9(e). 
 235. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/topics/ 
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 240. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, supra note 184, § 9. 
 241. Id.   
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1.4. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 
The final piece of major anti-drug housing legislation was the Quality 
Housing and Work Responsibility (“QHWR”) Act of 1998.242  The QHWR 
Act authorized PHAs to deny admission to applicant households with a 
member who had “engaged in any drug-related . . . criminal activity” within 
a “reasonable period.”243  Substance abuse was also once again a focal point 
of anti-drug efforts with the QHWR Act authorizing PHAs to require 
program applicants to sign a release of information for drug abuse treatment 
centers.244  PHAs were then permitted to consider this information in deciding 
whether the applicant or tenant was “currently” engaging in substance abuse 
(alcohol or drugs).245  
The QHWR Act also continued the War’s concentration on enforcement 
by encouraging and emphasizing capacity-building and cooperation between 
PHAs and law enforcement to address drug-related (and violent) crime in 
federally-subsidized housing.246  Owners that refused to evict households for 
suspicion of engaging in drug-related criminal activity were also at risk of 
PHAs refusing to enter into new subsidy contracts.247 
The administrative federal housing rules that developed during the War 
provided an officially sanctioned basis for denial of and termination from 
federally subsidized housing.  Neither a criminal conviction nor an official 
finding of a violation is required for exclusion.248  These administrative rules 
granted PHAs enormous discretion in making eligibility determinations and 
were encouraged by President Clinton himself.249 
In terms of admissions to public housing and Section 8 certificate and 
voucher programs, the HUD Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook 
recommended (and still recommends) that PHAs perform criminal 
background checks for a minimum of three years prior to potential 
admission.250  With Congress authorizing PHAs to pull criminal records and 
use a criminal history as a basis in admission and termination decisions, 
public housing and Section 8 administrative rules developed to exclude 
households strictly on the basis of a drug conviction of a household member.   
 
 242. Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, supra note 197, § 501. 
 243. Id. § 576(c). 
 244. Id. § 575(e).  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. § 586(b). 
 247. Id. § 545(a); see also Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, supra note 235. 
 248. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 146. 
 249. Id. at 145. 
 250. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 96–97 
(2003), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_10760.PDF. 
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PHAs are permitted to determine the “look-back” or set an “exclusion 
period,” which is the length of time applicants must be crime-free before 
being considered “eligible” for public housing. 251  According to the federal 
statute, the look-back period should be for a “reasonable time,” though the 
phrase is left undefined.252  Congress delegated that task to HUD and the 
PHAs, which has resulted in varied and, often, unnecessarily severe look-
back periods.  For example, some PHAs implemented permanent bans on 
specific crimes253 while others instituted unreasonably long look-back 
periods.254  A 2011 study that investigated the waiting periods outlined in 
over 100 tenant selections, found that over half of the plans had waiting 
period in the double digits.255  
Anti-drug housing legislation penetrated through many layers of 
national housing policy.  It influenced admissions, terminations, and lease 
provisions.  Moreover, it authorized a full-scale attack on public housing and 
Section 8 programming by law enforcement that was backed by massive 
federal expenditures.  The police could raid households and families could 
be torn apart and forbidden to live together pursuant to housing regulation.  
Fathers, sons, mothers, daughters, uncles, and brothers were arrested, banned 
from their public housing residence, and sent to jail or prison by the 
boatloads.  When they returned, they were prohibited from residing or even 
visiting with their family based on a number of program rules.  Thus, family 
members would be forced to choose between risking their subsidy and 
housing their family.  With this, the drug enforcement machine was able to 
flank poor, minority households, and their social networks under the banner 
of the Drug War.  The political rhetoric pronouncing, “law and order” and 
“tough on crime” policies oozed into the conservative cries for welfare 
 
 251. 24 C.F.R. § 5.855(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a).   
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c).  
 253. Marie Claire Tran-Leung, When Discretion Means Denial: The Use of Criminal Records to 
Deny Low-Income People Access to Federally Subsidized Housing in Illinois, SHRIVER CTR. 10–11 
(2011).  The Shriver Center reports that “Brown County Housing Authority in Illinois permanently 
bans applicants with prior convictions for any drug-related criminal activity other than possession 
for personal use, such as manufacturing and sale.”  Id. at 11 (citing BROWN COUNTY HOUSING 
AUTHORITY, ADMISSIONS AND OCCUPANCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES 5 (2008)).  
 254. Id.  The Shriver Center reviewed over 100 tenant selection plans in its study.  Of the 100 
that were reviewed, 77 adopted the following boilerplate language: 
Applicants who fall into the following categories may be rejected. 
a) Criminal convictions that involved physical violence to persons or property, or 
endangered the health and safety of other persons within the last ___ years; 
or 
b) Criminal convictions in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance within the last _____ years.   
Id. at 11–12.  
 255. Id. at 12.  
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reform.256  By the end of President Clinton’s first term, criminal justice policy 
had married welfare, producing harsh stipulations and exclusionary policies 
based on illicit behavior that further narrowed the class of eligible housing 
assistance recipients.257  “One Strike” tore through the hearts of many 
families, leaving displaced bodies littered across the battlefields of federally 
subsidized communities.  
2. Repercussions  
The attack on federal housing during the War created a climate of fear 
and hostility in public housing and Section 8 HCV and certificate households.  
The all-powerful government was permitted to aggressively hunt and trap 
residents and guests, as well as intrude into homes and search without notice 
or even a warrant.  When challenged, the government set up the system to 
suspend the procedural rights of those recipients suspected of drug related 
criminal activity.  And when the prisoners of the War returned home after 
paying their debt, they further discovered that they remained 
excommunicated from these housing communities.  
2.1. Collaboration Between Law Enforcement and Housing 
Authorities 
The political rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s unifying public housing, 
crime, and minorities—and legislation authorizing additional enforcement 
and exclusions in the housing context—sanctioned a full government siege 
on public housing and Section 8 HCV and certificate communities.258  The 
overlap between welfare and law enforcement agencies resulted in shared 
“goals and attitudes toward the poor” as well as “collaborative practices and 
shared information systems between welfare offices and various branches of 
the criminal justice system.”259  The Clinton welfare reforms authorized the 
policing of federal housing subsidies and, often, entire public housing 
communities.260  The expansion of the power of both law enforcement and 
PHAs promoted a negative and dangerous dichotomy between the 
government and the tenants.  Working together, PHAs and the police 
employed practices that mirrored a wartime criminal investigation, utilizing 
surveillance tactics and stigmatizing household members with overzealous 
 
 256. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 1. 
 257. Id. at 1–2, 35; Ocen, supra note 30, at 1563–64.  
 258. See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 30. 
 259. Id. at 2. 
 260. Ocean, supra note 30, at 1563. 
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investigative strategies.261  Housing recipients were socio-economically 
criminalized through the enforcement of wartime legislative directives and 
administrative rules.   
War on Drug legislation granted wide latitude in the decision-making 
authority to law enforcement and PHAs as well as infused federal dollars to 
fund collaborative strikes on federal housing communities.  With wartime 
rules stripping public housing and Section HCV recipients of privacy 
protections, these two bodies mutated into a monolithic enforcement 
structure that devoured its target.  Under the flag of President Clinton’s “One 
Strike” policy, PHAs and the police banned together and engaged in a type 
of lawful lawlessness justified on the basis of suspicion of drug activity. 
The drug enforcement piece was multifaceted.  It ran the gamut from 
the run of the mill “stop and frisk” campaigns to informant set-ups to 
community raids to civil forfeiture.  First, the intentional and widespread 
deployment of “stop and frisk” on public housing grounds was not a secret.262  
For example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed a federal class action 
lawsuit against the New York Police Department citing its “unlawful policy 
and practice of routinely stopping and arresting [New York City Housing 
Authority] residents and guests” in a racially discriminatory manner.263  The 
federal court upheld the challenge against a motion for summary 
judgement.264 
PHAs and local law enforcement worked together to not only 
investigate and, when necessary, arrest and remove violators from federal 
subsidized housing, they also collaborated to “set-up” targeted housing 
recipients to specifically terminate a household’s subsidy.265  One instance 
occurred in Berkeley, California beginning in 1989 with the City’s “Drug 
Mitigation Policy.”266  The policy goal was the elimination of drugs from the 
city through inter-departmental cooperation.267  One aspect of the policy 
focused on “high crime areas” and specifically targeted Section 8 certificate 
holders.268  The strategy was to trap suspected drug dealers through controlled 
buys.269  Using a confidential informant, the drug task force would engage in 
 
 261. Leah Goodridge & Helen Strom, Innocent Until Proven Guilty?: Examining the 
Constitutionality of Public Housing Evictions Based on Criminal Activity, 8 DUKE F. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 1, 6 (2016). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 427, 430 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 264. Id. at 431. 
 265. Reagan, supra note 21, at 208.   
 266. Id. at 208–11. 
 267. Id. at 208.  
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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controlled buys, use the information to secure a search warrant, execute a 
search of the unit, and then use that information to threaten the household 
with termination.270  Most of the tenants threatened with termination were 
grandmothers and mothers who had no knowledge of the acts of their 
grandchildren and children—the basis of the termination.271  
Searches of public housing units without advance notification or consent 
also transpired.272  In total disregard of tenants’ Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,”273 PHA employees and 
law enforcement would enter federal subsidized housing units without 
notifying the tenant in advance and without a warrant authorizing entry.274  In 
one Florida federal district court case, a PHA interpreted a lease provision to 
authorize a no-notice entry and inspection of a unit by a PHA and local law 
enforcement.275  The lease provision provided that an inspection may occur 
“at any time without advance notification when there is a reasonable cause to 
believe that an emergency exists.”276  The PHA interpreted the provision as 
a grant to enter without notice based on reasonable suspicion, as well as 
permission for the PHA to search for evidence of criminal activity.277  The 
district court granted the tenants’ request for a preliminary injunction against 
the PHA’s practice.278  The court concluded the PHA was required to afford 
advance notice and that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter 
without a warrant.279 
Perhaps the most damaging law enforcement/security tactics employed 
were the sweeps of public housing complexes authorized under the PHDEP.  
In pursuit of “drugs, weapons, and unauthorized persons,” law enforcement 
(in collaboration with PHA employees and security personnel) would 
perform sweeps of targeted buildings in public housing projects.280  The 
Chicago Housing Authority’s (“CHA”) “Operation Clean Sweep” is one such 
example.281  “Operation Clean Sweep, the CHAs ballyhooed security 
program, did chase the gangbangers and drug dealers from the Prairie Court 
 
 270. Id. at 208–09. 
 271. Id. at 209. 
 272. Noble v. Tooley, 125 F. Supp. 2d 481 (M.D. Fla. 2000). 
 273. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 274. Noble, 125 F. Supp. at 483. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id.  
 277. Id.  
 278. Id. at 486. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Chi. Hous. Auth., “Operation Clean Sweep” Implementation Guide, prepared for and filed 
in Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 30, 1989); Case 
Developments, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1281, 1291 (1991). 
 281. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280/ 
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high rise.  But it also robbed innocent tenants of their freedom and 
dignity . . . .”282 
Beginning in the late 1980s, Operation Clean Sweep included a series 
of raids on targeted buildings in Chicago public housing in pursuit of drugs, 
guns, and unauthorized persons.283  Under the guise of inspecting units for 
repairs, law enforcement, security personnel, and PHA maintenance would 
search units for drugs, weapons, and unauthorized people.284  In the 
December 1988 raid of the CHA’s Prairie Courts property, twenty-three 
people were brought to a nearby police station, where twelve were charged 
with criminal trespass of a state-supported building.285  Represented by the 
ACLU, tenants later filed suit against the CHA and the City of Chicago, 
which resulted in a consent decree designed to prevent the unconstitutional 
conduct identified during these sweeps while simultaneously providing 
necessary support to PHA efforts to improve public housing tenants’ quality 
of life.286  
2.2. Civil Forfeiture 
The government also used civil forfeiture to seize public housing 
leaseholds and evict tenants.  In two important federal district court opinions 
decided in 1990—United States v. 850 S. Maple287 and Richmond Tenants 
Organization, Inc. v. Kemp288—the Government’s civil forfeiture tactics 
were unveiled and successfully challenged.  The strategy was entitled, the 
“National Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Project”—a collaborative effort 
by HUD and DOJ, authorizing the government to seize the homes of public 
housing tenants suspected of drug-related activity without prior notice or a 
hearing.289  In both of these cases, the government did just that—it seized the 
 
 282. Jane Juffer, Clean Sweep’s Dirty Secret, CHI. READER (Oct. 4, 1990), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/clean-sweeps-dirty-secret/Content?oid=876436. 
 283. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280; Case Developments, supra note 280; Juffer, supra note 
282. 
 284. Chi. Hous. Auth., supra note 280. 
 285. Juffer, supra note 282 (“Twelve of those people were charged with criminal trespass of a 
state-supported building, a misdemeanor.  Three others were charged with unlawful use of a weapon 
and three with possession of cocaine.”). 
 286. Summeries v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 88-C-10566 (N.D. Ill, Nov. 30, 1989).  The decree 
established a new visitor policy whereby all tenants are permitted to have guests at all hours and for 
up to two weeks.  Id.  If a guest plans to stay for longer than one day, the tenant is required to get a 
guest card.  As for the sweeps, PHAs are not absolutely barred from engaging in the sweep strategy 
but are only permitted to do so if the PHA director finds a specific threat to a PHA tenant, employee, 
business invitee, or the property.  Id.   
 287. 743 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
 288. 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
 289. Richmond Tenants Org., 753 F. Supp. at 608. 
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homes of tenants without notice or a hearing.290  In turn, the courts found the 
practice unconstitutional.291 
In United State v. 850 S. Maple, the Government seized the public 
housing unit pursuant to a warrant authorizing the seizure of a public housing 
unit, as well as the immediate removal of the tenant.292  The warrant 
application alleged the premises, occupied by Juide and her family, was being 
used to facilitate the distribution of cocaine.293  The details are startling: 
[T]he United States Marshal seized the apartment and evicted Juide 
[the tenant] and her two children.  Juide and her family, who were 
asleep when they were awakened by the shouting of Government 
agents inside her apartment, were not given any prior notice of this 
action.  According to Juide, one agent came into her bedroom with 
a gun drawn and pointed directly at her head.  She was told to leave 
her apartment immediately. . . . Juide and her children were given 
less than fifteen minutes in which to gather their belongings before 
they were removed from their apartment. . . . In addition [to an 
unidentified person filming inside the apartment], several members 
of the news media were waiting outside the apartment unit with 
additional cameras when Juide exited.294 
Juide brought suit in federal district court, claiming that her due process 
was violated when her leasehold interest was seized without prior notice or a 
hearing.295  The district court agreed, finding that the government improperly 
evicted Juide without notice or a hearing where the Government’s stance on 
probable cause could be challenged.296   
In Richmond Tenants Organization v. Kemp, a federal district court in 
West Virginia held that the Government’s seizure of public housing units in 
accordance with the National Public Housing Asset Forfeiture Project was 
unlawful.297  In analyzing the issue, the district court, like the court in 850 S. 
Maple, pointed to the special privacy protection afforded to homes against 
unwarranted government intrusion.298  The court also noted the lack of 
 
 290. Id.; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 514–15. 
 291. Richmond Tenants Org., 753 F. Supp. at 608; 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 514–15. 
 292. 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. at 506. 
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. at 506–07 (citations omitted). 
 295. Id. at 511. 
 296. Id. at 509–11.  The court recognized the special constitutional protection given to the home 
and the lack of exigent circumstances that would permit the seizure of a home without prior notice 
and a hearing.  Id. at 510.  The fact that a judicial officer authorized the seizure was deemed 
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional understanding of due process.  Id.  
 297. Richmond Tenants Org., Inc. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607, 608 (E.D. Va. 1990).  
 298. Id. at 609. 
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exigent circumstances.299  In balancing the interests, the district court 
determined that the “the government’s interest is a narrow one of obtaining 
pre-notice seizure of a fixed item like a home” and not the broader interest in 
drug enforcement.300  For the court,  
[t]he eviction of an entire household prior to a formal judicial 
finding that forfeiture is justified constitutes a harm of major 
proportions.  To be rendered homeless for several months or more 
while a civil forfeiture action is pending may be traumatic and 
permanently damaging.301  
Challenging PHA termination determinations was and continues to be 
complicated by the lack of legal services and the existing rules that forego 
traditional legal process.   
 
The racial implications of the War’s influence on federally-subsidized 
housing programs cannot be overstated.  To begin with, Black households 
are overrepresented among extremely low income or “ELI” renters and 
constitute 45% of public housing residents, while 20% are Hispanic and 32% 
are white.302  Similar percentages are reflected in the Section 8 HCV program, 
with Black households representing 45% of voucher holders compared to 
16% Hispanic households and 35% white households.303  Based strictly on 
numbers, Black households were preordained to be disproportionately 
affected by the housing aspect of the War.  Compound this with the disparate 
arrest and conviction rates of people of color, along with federal housing 
program rules that allow exclusions based on suspicion of drug-related 
activity, and it is clear that Black and brown communities were destined to 
experience the greatest losses in the War.304  
 
 299. Id.  
 300. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 
1989)). 
 301. Id.  
 302. Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., Who Lives in Federally Assisted Housing?, 2 HOUSING 
SPOTLIGHT 1, 3 (2012).   
 303. Id.   
 304. See HELEN R. KANOVSKY, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL 
GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL 
RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 2 (2016), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF; E. ANN 
CARSON, BUREAU JUST. STATS., PRISONERS IN 2014 15, tbl. 10 (2015), 
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf; FBI CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERV. DIV., CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2013 tbl.43A (2014) (reporting that African Americans comprised 28.3% of all 
arrestees in 2013); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NATIONAL POPULATION BY CHARACTERISTICS (2021), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-detail.html (reporting 
data showing that individuals identifying as African-American or Black alone made upon only 
12.4% of the total U.S. population at 2013 year-end). 
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As the power of PHAs and the police grew, the rights and liberties of 
federal housing recipients decreased.  During the War, families were 
separated, homes were taken, and the legal process was suspended for those 
suspected of drug-type criminality.  Public housing tenants, and HCV and 
certificate holders, were unsympathetic collateral victims in the War on 
Drugs—victims themselves were branded as lazy, conniving, criminals, or 
criminal affiliates.  This narrative encouraged a more concentrated and 
aggressive assault on the federal housing front.  The unification of criminal 
enforcement with conservative welfare reform produced the ideal 
battleground, with the government fortifying the downhill advantage.  The 
rules that authorized such expansive attack remain and such scenarios 
continue to play out every day.  
The War on Drugs’ influence and impact on national housing policy was 
devastating to prisoners returning home and their families.  Prisoners are 
often the poorest in society and lack the financial capacity to pay for private 
housing.305  Anti-drug legislation and housing rules result in denials of federal 
subsidy programs and/or the possibility of risking a household’s subsidy if 
program rules are violated.  Approximately two-thirds of returning prisoners 
rely on family for housing upon release, but the risk to the household is often 
grave.306  Homelessness is sometimes the only option.  Branded with a drug 
conviction, the War’s rules operate to maintain a physical separation between 
those returning home and their families.  This in turn impacts family 
reunification; it affects opportunities for critical emotional and intimate 
bonding, which is essential to heal families from the trauma of the War.  
In addition to the familial disruption and racial impact, wartime housing 
rules work to deprive returning prisoners of socio-economic citizenship.307  
Housing is the starting point of any successful reintegration and is linked to 
a variety of positive outcomes.308  Stable housing is correlated with reduced 
recidivism and improves the prospect of creating positive relationships.309  
Without housing, one does not gain stable footing.  Once released from the 
criminal policy grip of the War, prisoners continue to be targeted and 
assaulted in the civil context.  
 
 305. ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 148. 
 306. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF 
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 72 (2019), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [hereinafter COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES].  
 307. GUSTAFSON, supra note 30, at 53. 
 308. Breanne Pleggenkuhle, Beth M. Huebner & Kimberly R. Kras, Solid Start: Supportive 
Housing, Social Support, and Reentry Transitions, 39 J. CRIME & JUST. 380, 381 (2016). 
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Today, the competition for affordable housing is stiff.  An estimated 43 
million people live at or below the federal poverty level and compete for a 
mere 7.5 million federally assisted housing units.310  Households that don’t 
“play by the rules” and are suspected of drug use or any drug-related criminal 
activity are subject to denial or termination from federal housing 
programming.  For HUD,  
[a]t a time when the shrinking supply of affordable housing is not 
keeping pace with the number of Americans who need it, it is 
reasonable to allocate scarce resources to those who play by the 
rules. . . . By refusing to evict or screen out problem tenants, we 
are unjustly denying responsible and deserving low-income 
families access to housing and are jeopardizing the community and 
safety of existing residents who abide by the terms of their lease.311  
Federal housing program eligibility thus becomes a cut-off point to help 
“triage” the housing pressure and is “a politically cost-free way to entirely 
cut out a large group of people from the pool of those seeking housing 
assistance.”312  
III. AFTERSHOCK  
 
“My own view is that divisions never benefit anyone”  
– Niccolo Machiavelli313 
 
After 2009, the United States experienced a decline in its state jail and 
prison populations—the first decline in forty years. 314  The number of adults 
under correctional supervision (probation, jail, or prison) also fell for the first 
time in thirty years. 315  Beginning in the early 2000s (and after the United 
 
 310. BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, JESSICA L. SEMEGA & MELISSA A. KOLLAR, U.S. CENSUS 
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media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/prisoncount20
10pdf.pdf. 
 315. Id.  
  
606 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:565 
 
States had been ranked the world’s number one jailer), criminal justice policy 
in America finally began to pivot.   
A. Criminal Policy 
 
“America is the land of second chance, and when the gates of 
the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.” 
– President George W. Bush316 
 
By 2000, it was clear to researchers and scholars that the War on Drugs 
was a disaster.  Researchers reported that drug use remained constant and that 
government enforcement and interdiction efforts were unsuccessful in 
combatting drug traffickers.317  Millions were incarcerated, with the majority 
of prisoners being minority and nonviolent offenders.318  The incarceration 
rate had little correlation to the crime rate, and violent crime decreased 50% 
between 1989 and 2017.319  In terms of expenditures, mass incarceration was 
an “unsustainable long-term strategy.”320  And the label as the world’s 
number one jailer was considered a political embarrassment.321  It was time 
to review and overhaul drug policy.  The focus was criminal law and 
procedure, and it was the judicial branch that signaled the need for policy 
reform and legislative change.   
1. The Judicial Branch 
It was the very body charged with crafting the details of federal drug 
policy from the start of the War that made the first calls for change: the United 
States Sentencing Commission. 322  The United States Supreme Court also 
confronted questions concerning the constitutional validity of various aspects 
of War on Drugs legislation.  The conclusions and decisions offered by these 
two judicial bodies together signaled an urgent need for legislative 
 
 316. George W. Bush, 2004 State of the Union Address, C-SPAN (Jan. 20, 2004), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?c4574544/president-bush-prisoner-entry-initiative. 
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modifications to existing criminal drug policy, specifically concerning the 
100:1 ratio and the imposition of long, harsh federal sentencing practices. 
The crack cocaine to powder cocaine ratio (100:1) was the first occasion 
for the counteroffensive against the War’s drug policy.323  The Sentencing 
Commission led the battle by denouncing the ratio in its annual reports to 
Congress beginning in the early 1990s.324  Calling for the elimination of the 
ratio, the Commission described the problem as “urgent and compelling,” 
concluding that the ratio was based upon a misunderstanding about the 
dangers of crack.325  The Commission continued its denunciation of the 
penalty scheme until 2007 when, in the absence of congressional action, it 
adjusted its own Guidelines, lowering the recommended sentence for crack 
offenses from 100:1 to 20:1.326   
The Court inadvertently entered the fray in 2000 when it decided the 
case of Apprendi v. New Jersey.327  New Jersey had a sentencing scheme 
similar to that of the federal sentencing guidelines: allowing the sentencing 
judge to find facts by a lesser standard of proof at sentencing than is required 
in a criminal trial.328  If the judge found specific facts, the judge was permitted 
to enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum.329  This practice 
could, and often did, result in longer sentences.  Although a state case, this 
essentially called the sentencing provisions outlined in the federal scheme 
into question.  The Court found the penalty structure to be a violation of a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury’s determination of facts.330  
With this, the Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”331  With “the stroke of a pen,” the 
 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 8–9 (2007), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-
and-reports/drug-topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
 326. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,’ GUIDELINES MANUAL 140, § 2D1.1 (2007). 
 327. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 328. Id. at 467–68.  Petitioner Apprendi was charged with possession of a firearm for an unlawful 
person in the second-degree, which carried a five- to ten-year term of imprisonment.  Id. at 468.  
The count did not include a reference to the hate crime statute.  After he plead guilty, the prosecutor 
moved to enhance his sentence based on the hate crime statute.  Id. at 468–69.  At sentencing, the 
prosecutor only had to prove the elements of the statute by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id. at 
469.  Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years in prison on the firearm count, two years more than 
permitted by statute.  Id. at 471. 
 329. Id. at 490–92. 
 330. Id. at 490. 
 331. Id.  
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foundation of two decades of state sentencing began to crumble.332  As Justice 
O’Connor predicted in her dissent, the federal system followed.333 
The War was now being attacked from a constitutional angle.  The first 
in the trilogy of War on Drugs criminal policy, the Crime Control Act of 
1984, was dealt a severe blow from which it would not recover.  In 2005, the 
Court decided United States v. Booker,334 holding that the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, standing as mandatory, violated the Sixth Amendment.335  The 
Court found two provisions unconstitutional and directed the federal courts 
to consider the Guidelines as “effectively advisory.”336  One of the hallmark 
provisions of anti-drug legislation, the Sentencing Reform Act, was 
essentially gutted.  Per Booker, federal courts were required to impose a 
criminal sentence based on the statutory factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a);337 the Guidelines were only advisory.  Once Booker was decided, 
the War’s sentencing structure crumbled.  
Soon after Booker, the Court considered constitutional issues 
concerning the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986’s 100:1 powder to crack 
cocaine ratio.  The Court dealt the notorious 100:1 ratio a deathblow by the 
Court between 2007 and 2009 in two cases: Kimbrough v. United States338 
and Spears v. United States.339  In Kimbrough, the Court held that federal 
courts may ignore the Guidelines based on ideological differences with the 
ratio.340  In upholding the lower court’s decision to depart from the ratio, the 
Court cited the Sentencing Commission’s 2002 report finding that 
approximately 85% of federal criminal defendants convicted of crack 
offenses were Black, which in turn promoted a lack of confidence in the 
system.341  For the Court, Congress was credulous with regard to the dangers 
of crack at the time that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was enacted.342  In 
Spears, the Court took Kimbrough a step further and held that federal courts 
were permitted to establish their own ratios.343 
 
 332. Id. at 550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 333. Id. (“[T]he apparent effect of the Court’s opinion today is to halt the current debate on 
sentencing reform in its tracks and to invalidate with the stroke of a pen three decades’’ worth of 
nationwide reform.”). 
 334. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 335. Id. at 244. 
 336. Id. at 245. 
 337. Id.; see Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 489–92 (2011). 
 338. 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 339. 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curiam). 
 340. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91. 
 341. Id. at 98. 
 342. Id. at 95. 
 343. Spears, 555 U.S. at 265–68.  
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2. Legislative Branch 
The Congressional rollback of the War’s anti-drug laws formally started 
in 2007 and continues into the present.  The consequences of the War on 
Drugs—mass incarceration, the costs of corrections, and international 
shame—were now on full display with no reasonable justification to continue 
the War.  Judicial signaling added pressure.  Congress had to act.  In the past 
twelve years, three major pieces of legislation were enacted that work to 
comprehensively review and modify the War’s anti-drug policy: (1) the 
Second Chance Act of 2007,344 (2) the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,345 and 
(3) the First Step Act of 2018.346  Redemption, fairness, and second chances 
formulate the ideological underpinnings of all three Acts.   
2.1. The Second Chance Act of 2007 
With the Second Chance Act of 2007,347 Congress started its retreat 
from the War and introduced an ideology of redemption and compassion into 
the criminal drug laws.  Amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, the Act focused on alternatives to incarceration348 and 
drug treatment, both in and out of prison.349  The legislation represented a 
clear withdrawal from the stringent mandatory imprisonment directives and 
supply-side attacks authorized by the War’s anti-drug legislation.   
A bipartisan effort, the Act encouraged a holistic approach to offender 
release and promoted federal reentry efforts.350  The legislation allocated 
grant dollars to agencies and organizations that implemented evidence-based 
programming proven to reduce recidivism.351  Concentrating on both public 
safety and criminal recidivism, Congress pledged support to the efforts of 
both state and federal criminal justice systems that were working towards 
successfully transitioning the prisoners of the War back into society.352  
Although the Second Chance Act did not repeal the harsh sentencing laws 
outright or modify the War’s supply-side strategy, it started to shift the 
direction of America’s criminal justice approach.   
 
 344. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199 § 1, 122 Stat. 657 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 345. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 1; Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27. 
 346. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9, § 1; Erin McCarthy Holliday, President Trump signs 
criminal justice reform First Step Act into law (Dec. 21, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.jurist.org/ 
news/2018/12/president-trump-signs-criminal-justice-reform-first-step-act-into-law/. 
 347. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(3). 
 348. Id. § 2901 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3797q). 
 349. Id. § 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17521). 
 350. Id. § 101(a)(3). 
 351. Id. § 101(g). 
 352. Id. § 3(a)(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17501). 
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2.2. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
Three years later, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,353 
which continued the statutory counterattack against the War’s anti-drug 
legislation.  The Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) amended the Controlled 
Substances Act once again and imposed a powder-to-crack cocaine ratio of 
18:1 as opposed to 100:1.354  Before the FSA was passed, the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence required for distribution of fifty grams or more 
of crack cocaine was ten years.355  After the Act, 280 grams or more were 
required to trigger the ten-year sentence.356  The FSA also eliminated the 
mandatory minimum sentence imposed for simple possession of crack 
cocaine.357  In enacting the FSA, Congress was acting to “‘restore fairness to 
federal cocaine sentencing’ laws that had unfairly impacted blacks for almost 
25 years.”358  The legislation shifted the political focus from drug offenders 
as a broad class to violent drug traffickers specifically, by increasing the 
penalties for violent drug offenders359 and those who play a substantial role 
in drug conspiracies.360  Although the Act offered promise of relief from the 
harshness of the War’s drug policy, it applied only prospectively.361  
2.3. The First Step Act of 2018 
Most recently, Congress enacted the First Step Act in 2018.362  The First 
Step Act continued the momentum of redemption with a number of 
provisions to dismantle the War’s legislation and further encourage reentry 
programming.  Perhaps most significantly, the Act called for the retroactive 
application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010’s powder-to-crack cocaine 
 
 353. Id. 
 353. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 1; Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27. 
 354. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)); 
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27. 
 355. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)); 
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27. 
 356. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 2(a) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)); 
Obama, supra note 12, at 826–27; Memorandum from Gary G. Grindle, Acting Deputy Atty. Gen., 
to All Federal Prosecutors 2 (Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/ 
2014/07/23/fair-sentencing-act-memo.pdf (regarding the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010). 
 357. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 3; Grindle, supra note 356, at 1. 
 358. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated, 746 F. 3d 647 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
 359. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 6; Grindle, supra note  356, at 2. 
 360. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, supra note 9, § 6. 
 361. Id. 
 362. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9. 
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ratio of 18:1.363  Thus, all federal prisoners convicted and sentenced under 
the old 100:1 ratio were to be resentenced under the 18:1 ratio.364   
The First Step Act also allocated funding pursuant to the Second Chance 
Act of 2007365 and included a number of reentry-related provisions that offer 
incentives to federal prisoners who participate in recidivism reduction 
programming in prison.366  In addition, the Act encourages the federal Bureau 
of Prisons to partner with community, faith-based, and nonprofit 
organizations to provide federal recidivism reduction programming in 
prison.367  The First Step Act not only continued to release the prison pressure 
valve, it also maintained the stream of federal dollars to support the prisoners 
of the War in their transition back home. 
3. Executive Branch 
The policies of the Executive Branch shifted along with those of the 
other two branches of government.  In his 2004 State of the Union address, 
President George W. Bush asked Americans “to consider another group of 
Americans in need of help”—the 600,000 people released from prison back 
into society annually.368  He proposed a $300 million federal allocation to 
reentry efforts that would assist with providing newly released prisoners 
transitional housing and employment readiness programming—the Prisoner 
Reentry Initiative (“PRI”).369  Both liberal Democrats, such as Representative 
John Conyers, and conservative Republicans, such as Sam Brownback, 
supported the proposal. 
With the election of President Obama, DOJ made sweeping changes to 
the administration of criminal justice through its “Smart on Crime” initiative, 
which included major changes to federal charging policies.370  In 2010, 
Attorney General Eric Holder began reversing and modifying a number of 
Department charging guidelines, including a policy that required federal 
prosecutors to charge federal defendants with offenses that could result in the 
 
 363. Id. § 404 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841). 
 364. Id.  
 365. Id. Title V (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10101). 
 366. Id. § 101.  These incentives may include increased phone privileges, additional time for 
visitation, placement in a facility closer to the prisoner’s release residence, increased commissary, 
and extended email opportunities.  Id. 
 367. Id. § 504(g). 
 368. 2004 State of the Union Address, supra note 316.  
 369. Id. 
 370. Obama, supra note 12, at 824. 
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harshest possible sentence.371  Instead, federal prosecutors were instructed to 
bring charges based on an individualized analysis of the defendant’s 
circumstances, as “equal justice depends on individualized justice, and smart 
law enforcement demands it.”372  Attorney General Holder also directed 
federal prosecutors to stop utilizing “Section 851” enhancements—a 
recidivist enhancement that triggers severe mandatory minimums and longer 
sentences based on prior drug convictions—to acquire leverage in plea 
negotiations. 373  In 2013, and for the first time in thirty-three years, the 
proportion of drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a minimum 
penalty declined and the overall federal prison population experienced a 
reduction.374 
During President Obama’s second term, DOJ announced a number of 
data driven reentry related initiatives emphasizing evidence-based practices 
to reduce recidivism and address core behavioral issues. 375  In 2016, it 
announced that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) was constructing “a 
semiautonomous school district within the federal prison system—one that 
blends face-to-face classroom instruction with education software on mobile 
tablets.”376  That same year, DOJ launched “National Reentry Week,” where 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced the Administration’s strategic 
reentry plan—the “Roadmap to Reentry.” 377  The Roadmap outlined an 
overhaul to the federal prison system with the twin goals of reducing 
 
 371. Id. at 825 (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to All 
Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), https://subjecttoinquiry.lexblogplatformtwo.com/ 
files/2013/09/Holder-Charging-Memo-5-19-10.pdf.).  
 372. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to All 
Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), https://subjecttoinquiry.lexblogplatformtwo.com/ 
files/2013/09/Holder-Charging-Memo-5-19-10.pdf.). 
 373. Id. (citing Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Att’y. Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to 




 374. Id. at 826 (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL 
YEAR 2015 7–8 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-publications/2016/FY15_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf; BUREAU 
OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2013 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf). 
 375. Id. at 832 (citing Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism by Strengthening the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
archives/prison-reform).  
 376. Id. (citing Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Announces Reforms at Bureau of Prisons to Reduce Recidivism and Promote Inmate Rehabilitation 
’(Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-reforms-bureau-
prisons-reduce-recidivism-andpromote-inmate).  
 377. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ROADMAP TO REENTRY (2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/reentry/file/844356/download). 
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recidivism and improving outcomes for prison releasees.378  Halfway houses 
and residential reentry centers also experienced some reform, with DOJ 
crafting new standards and funding various reentry-related costs (for 
example, state-issued identification).379  
Recent presidents have also used the executive clemency power to 
eliminate the relics of the War’s drug policy.  Though the clemency power 
was used frequently at one point in American history, the practice declined 
with the advent of the parole system.380  With “truth in sentencing” rhetoric 
pronounced in the 1980s, the use of clemency was largely abandoned.381  The 
Obama Administration looked closely at the clemency power as a possible 
tool to address the excessive sentencing practices of the War.382  More 
specifically the efforts were meant 
to identify types of inmates who deserve particular consideration 
for clemency—and to encourage individuals who have 
demonstrated good behavior in the federal system to seek 
clemency if they were sentenced under outdated laws that have 
since been changed and are no longer appropriate to accomplish 
the legitimate goals of sentencing.383   
With this, the Obama Administration launched an executive clemency 
initiative.  By the end of his Presidency, President Obama had commuted the 
criminal sentences of 1,927 individuals, totaling more commutations than the 
past eleven American presidents combined.384  In using clemency during his 
term to remedy unjust wartime sentences, President Obama brought visibility 
to the power and its potential use.  During his administration, President 
Trump also used the power to provide relief to federal prisoners of the War 
on Drugs.385 
The reform in criminal justice policy at the federal level has trickled 
down to the states.  States are currently reforming supervision and 
implementing sentencing practices that authorize alternatives to 
imprisonment.386  They are increasing resources to support reentry-related 
 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id.  
 380. Id. at 835 (observing that between 1885 and 1930, an average 222 pardons were issued per 
year) (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 814 (2015)). 
 381. Id. at 835–36 (citing Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (last updated Oct. 28, 2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm). 
 382. Id. at 836. 
 383. Id.  
 384. Id. at 837. 
 385. Id.; Pardons Granted by President Donald J. Trump (2017–2021), supra note 12. 
 386. Cole, supra note 171, at 30. 
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programming,387 with a number of states reinvesting cost savings associated 
with early release programs into community programming in the inner 
cities.388  States are closing prisons,389 and many are offering more substance 
abuse programs, as well as diversions to treatment as an alternative to 
imprisonment.390  However, the redemption and second chances offered in 
the criminal justice context at both the federal and state levels have failed to 
penetrate other critical areas of substantive law and regulation influenced by 
the War on Drugs, such as national housing policy. 
B. Housing Policy  
 
“If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen 
the side of the oppressor.” 
– Desmond Tutu391 
 
The War’s influence in the criminal context permeated federal housing 
policy.  However, the reform movement has not resulted in the same 
legislative overhaul in the federal housing context.  Instead, the statutes and 
regulations enacted during the War remain on the books without modification 
or amendment.  With this, the proclamation of redemption and second 
chances for the prisoners of the War remains a promise unfulfilled: the offer 
extends only so far. 
It is no secret that a disproportionate number of the poor have a criminal 
history or have immediate family members with criminal records.  Over 11 
million men and women are moving in and out of U.S. jails every year.392  An 
estimated 100 million Americans—roughly a third of the adult population—
have some type of criminal record.393  Approximately 600,000 prisoners are 
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 390. Cole, supra note 171, at 30.  
 391. OXFORD ESSENTIAL QUOTATIONS (5th ed. 2017), https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/ 
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2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/. 
 393. SENT’G PROJ., AMERICANS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 2 (2015), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-
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released each year without a program to assist in the transition back into 
society.394  Most of these individuals are slated to return home to their 
families, many of whom may be living in federally subsidized housing.395  
As mentioned above, approximately two-thirds of those returning home 
rely on family for housing.396  Studies indicate this dependence is long-term 
in nature, finding only 19% of the respondents are able to establish 
independent housing nearly a year and half after release.397  It is critical that 
newly released persons have instant housing, as the highest risk of recidivism 
occurs immediately upon release.398  Housing serves as the foundation of a 
productive and successful reintegration.399  Positive outcomes associated 
with stable housing include better employment opportunities and a reduction 
in criminal recidivism.400  
For those returning home, securing housing is extremely difficult.  
Prisoners returning to families that receive federal housing assistance may 
endanger the household subsidy and/or be outright denied a tenancy.401  The 
private housing market also may not be an option, as returning persons 
typically have a minimal work history and little or no money.402 
In the past thirty years, reentry scholars and advocates have encouraged 
the review and reform of a number of collateral consequences, gaining 
significant traction with voting and employment.403  For example, 
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza’s 2000 study demonstrated the way in 
which felon disenfranchisement could affect election outcomes.404  Today, 
 
 394. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 393, at 24.  
 395. Letter from Shaun Donovan, Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev., to PHA Executive Directors 1 
(June 17, 2011), https://www.usich.gov/resources/uploads/asset_library/Rentry_letter_from_ 
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 396. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 306. 
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Release, URB. INST. (2008). 
 398. Pleggenkuhle, Huebner & Kras, supra note 308, at 381; Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul, 
Prisoners Once Removed: The Children and Families of Prisoners, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: 
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most states re-enfranchise upon completion of a criminal sentence.405  
Moreover, for the past decade, not-for-profit agencies, as well as 
governmental bodies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), have worked on implementing fairness standards in 
both the public and private employment markets concerning applicants with 
criminal histories.  However, national housing policy has remained largely 
untouched.  Individuals with a drug history or suspicion of drug activity 
remain excluded from federally subsidized housing at a time when they need 
it the most—upon release from prison.  This translates to a “we’ll let ‘em 
vote when their sentence is complete, we may even let ‘em work but we don’t 
want to live with ‘em or let ‘em live off our taxpayer dollars” sentiment.  The 
War’s anti-drug housing legislation should be reviewed with the purpose of 
recalibrating the rules to reflect the redemptive ideological shift in policy 
underlying the reform experienced in criminal context.  Though minimal, 
there has been some movement in the housing arena that could be used as a 
springboard for a thorough and intentional review of anti-drug policy. 
1. Judicial Branch 
Unlike the experience in the criminal law context, the judicial branch 
has been somewhat timid and, at times, torn between administrative 
deference and the principles of fairness and equity.  Courts reviewing housing 
rules and practices typically defer to PHA administrative decisions.406  But 
courts have also invalidated and reversed PHA administrative determinations 
steeped in the harshness encouraged by the War on Drugs.407  Lower court 
decisions addressing anti-drug legislation specifically fall into two principal 
categories: (1) PHA use of criminal records and (2) terminations based on 
drug-related criminal activity.   
Perhaps the issue that has gained most traction in the courts is the use of 
criminal histories to disqualify or terminate households from federally 
subsidized housing.  As mentioned, courts generally defer to PHA 
administrative termination decisions.408  In recent years, however, some 
courts have invalidated PHA determinations.  For example, in Cabrini-Green 
Local Advisory Council v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,409 a federal district court 
struck down a lease provision that required the eviction of tenants convicted 
 
 405. SENT’G PROJ., FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 2 (2014), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.
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 406. See supra Part II. 
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 408. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1995); South S.F. 
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of a felony.410  The court concluded that the provision was a blanket 
prohibition that improperly expanded the PHA’s authority without any 
rational relation “to any legitimate housing purposes.”411  In another case, 
Landers v. Chicago Housing Authority,412 the Chicago Housing Authority 
(“CHA”) denied the petitioner’s application based on “a pattern of arrest 
and/or conviction.”413  The petitioner produced evidence that all of the 
criminal charges were dismissed.414  Despite this evidence, his application 
was still denied.415  On appeal to the circuit court, the court determined that 
the petitioner did not pose a threat, and that almost all his arrests were 
dismissed and were also the result of homelessness.416  The Illinois Appellate 
Court affirmed the circuit court.417 
The War’s housing program rules also make it difficult to maintain the 
family structure when a household member has a criminal history, 
particularly a drug history.  For many households, accepting a federal 
housing program subsidy is a trap—you have housing assistance, but you 
must sacrifice a family member in exchange for housing.  Many have trouble 
excising fathers, sons, daughter, and mothers from their households and thus 
risk a finding of program rule violations.  The courts are hearing such cases.  
In In re Juanita Matos v. Hernandez,418 a New York appellate court 
 
 410. ..Id. at *15–16.  The lease provision read: “For termination of the LEASE, the following 
procedures shall be followed by LESSOR and the TENANT: . . . The LEASE may be 
terminated . . . [when] [t]he TENANT or any authorized family member is convicted of a felony.”  
Id. at *3–4 (alterations in original).  
 411. Id. at *8–9, *13. 
 412. 936 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 413. Id. at 736. 
 414. Id. at 737, 740. 
 415. Id.  
 416. Id. at 737. 
 417. Id. at 742.  The court reviewed the CHA’s administrative plan rules and regulations.  Id. at 
738–39.  Examining the provision governing rejections based on arrests reports, the court pointed 
out that the CHA’s own policy requires the CHA to place “the applicant’s name . . . on the wait list 
until documentation is presented showing the outcome of the case.”  Id. at 739.  For the court, the 
evidence in the case was “bare bones.”  Id. at 740.  Recognizing that the CHA is not required to 
meet any evidentiary standard, the court was displeased that the CHA failed to even meet a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  Id. at 741. 
 418. 79 A.D. 3d 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also Wellington Hous. Auth. v. Murphy, 131 
S.W.3d 378, 379 (Mo. App. 2004).  In Murphy, the PHA terminated the respondent’s lease for 
“having an unauthorized male . . . with a criminal record residing in your apartment and/or inviting 
a male . . . with a criminal record to your unit after being told of his criminal conviction and that he 
was not allowed to come on any Wellston Housing Authority’s property, and/or placing other 
residents in danger because of [his] prior criminal activity.”  Murphy, 131 S.W.3d at 379 (alterations 
in original).  On appeal, the housing authority argued that the trial court erred in determining that it 
could not evict the tenant for her guest’s prior criminal record.  Id.  It argued that 42 U.S.C. 
1437d(l)(6) granted PHAs the discretion to terminate a tenant’s lease on the basis of a guest’s 
“criminal activity” that may threaten the safety of other residents.  Id. at 380.  The Missouri Court 
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determined that a PHA’s decision to condition the continuation of housing 
benefits on the permanent exclusion of the tenant’s son “was so 
disproportionate to the offense as to shock the judicial conscience” and 
warrant a “lesser sanction.”419  In this case, the tenant’s son was convicted of 
two misdemeanor offenses but was always in compliance with program 
rules.420  The tenant was also disabled and relied on her son and his younger 
brother for her care.421  The court held that the PHA’s determination was 
disproportionate to the tenant’s offense.422  Nevertheless, courts generally 
continue to enforce terminations based on drug-related criminal activity. 
The drug-related criminal activity lease provision has also been 
challenged in the courts.  The provision extends not only to the tenant and 
household members, but also to “guest[s]” and other persons “under the 
tenant’s control.”423  A “guest” subjects the household to greater liability than 
an “other person under the tenant’s control.”424  A “guest,” as defined by 
HUD, is a person “staying in the unit with the permission of the tenant or 
another household member with the authority to give such permission.”425  
An “other person under the tenant’s control” is defined as a “short-term 
invitee who is not ‘staying’ in the unit.”426  Taken together, the statute and 
regulations create strict liability for the actions of a third party.   
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court in HUD v. Rucker427 upheld 
the provision, determining that the no-fault eviction lease provision did not 
violate due process.428  Instead, the PHA was acting as a landlord enforcing 
the lease.429  In that case, public housing tenants of the Oakland Housing 
Authority (“OHA”) in Oakland, California sued HUD, OHA, and the 
 
of Appeals interpreted the governing statute to only include criminal activity that occurred during 
the term of the lease.  Id.  Because the criminal record of the guest occurred prior to the term of the 
lease, that conduct was excluded from the conduct considered by the statute as relevant to a 
termination.  Id.  The PHA also argued that because it authorized to reject an applicant based on a 
criminal record or prevent individuals with criminal records from entering the premises, it is also 
authorized to evict a tenant based on a guest’s criminal record.  Id. at 380–81.  The court disagreed 
recognizing that a PHAs right to exclude an individual with a criminal record is “separate and 
distinct” from the PHAs rights in relation to a termination of a tenant.  Id. at 381.  
 419. Hernandez, 79 A.D.3d at 466–67. 
 420. Id. at 467. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 466–67 
 423. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(iii). 
 424. Id.  
 425. Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,776, 
28,777 (May 24, 2001) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.100). 
 426. Id. at 28,777–78 (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 5.100). 
 427. 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002). 
 428. Id. at 135. 
 429. Id. at 135. 
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Director of OHA in federal court after the Authority initiated eviction 
proceedings in state court based on the no-fault lease provision.430  The state 
court eviction proceedings included three cases based on the following facts: 
(1) that respective grandsons of respondents William Lee and 
Barbara Hill, both of whom were listed as residents on the leases, 
were caught in the apartment complex parking lot smoking 
marijuana; (2) that the daughter of respondent Pearlie Rucker, who 
resides with her and is listed on the lease as a resident, was found 
with cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe three blocks from Rucker’s 
apartment; and (3) that . . . Herman Walker’s caregiver and two 
others were found with cocaine in Walker’s apartment.  OHA had 
issued Walker notices of a lease violation on the first two 
occasions, before initiating the eviction action after the third 
violation.431 
The tenants argued the statute did not require the lease terms to evict 
“innocent” tenants and alternatively argued that if the statute did require such 
evictions, then the statute is unconstitutional.432 
The district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the OHA 
from evicting tenants “for drugrelated [sic] criminal activity that does not 
occur within the tenant’s apartment unit when the tenant did not know of and 
had no reason to know of, the drug-related criminal activity.”433  The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the statute did 
permit no-fault evictions regardless of the knowledge of the tenant.434  An en 
banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, and affirmed the district court’s 
determination that HUD’s interpretation authorizing the eviction of 
“‘innocent’ tenants ‘is inconsistent with Congressional intent.’”435  For the 
en banc court, such an interpretation raised “‘serious questions under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ because it permits ‘tenants to 
be deprived of their property interest without any relationship to individual 
wrongdoing.’”436  The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local 
public authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related 
activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew or 
should have known about the activity.437 
 
 430. Id. at 129. 
 431. Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). 
 432. Id. at 129. 
 433. Id. at 129–30. 
 434. Id. at 130.  
 435. Id.  
 436. Id. at 135 (quoting Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 437. Id. at 136. 
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The Court’s decision was based primarily on a textual analysis finding 
that the statutory language was clear.438  However, it addressed the due 
process concern, concluding that the government was not trying to punish or 
regulate “respondents as members of the general populace.”439  For the Court, 
the government was instead “acting as a landlord of property that it owns, 
invoking a clause in a lease to which respondents have agreed and which 
Congress has expressly required.”440  With this, third-party strict liability 
based on drug-related criminal activity was proclaimed constitutionally 
permissible. 
Lower courts struggling with the third-party strict liability lease 
provision produce mixed results.  Generally, a household member that 
possesses drugs or engages in drug-related criminal activity subjects the 
entire household to termination and/or eviction.  For example, in South San 
Francisco Housing Authority v. Guillory441 an entire family was evicted 
based on the actions of the son, a household member who possessed drugs 
within the home.442  The court concluded that the entire household was liable 
for the acts of one member.443  
Some courts have identified factual nuances that permit a tenant to 
escape liability.  In Housing Authority of the City of Hoboken v. Alicea,444 the 
PHA terminated a tenant from federally subsidized programming based on 
her son’s arrest and conviction of drug possession in the tenant’s apartment 
building—not in the tenant’s unit.  The court disagreed with the PHA’s 
determination because the tenant did not allow her son to live in her unit nor 
did she have knowledge that her son was involved in drug-related criminal 
activity.445  Also, in Syracuse Housing Authority v. Boule,446 a tenant was 
evicted for the drug-related criminal activities of a babysitter’s guest.447  The 
court concluded that the tenant had not given the babysitter authority to invite 
guests to her unit and thus had no knowledge that the babysitter’s guests sold 
drugs from her unit.448  However, in Housing Authority of New Orleans v. 
Green,449 a tenant was terminated because a friend of her daughter hid drugs 
 
 438. Id. at 130–32. 
 439. Id. at 135. 
 440. Id. 
 441. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 442. Id. at 369. 
 443. Id. at 371–72. 
 444. 688 A.2d 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997). 
 445. Id. at 110. 
 446. 265 A.D.2d. 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 447. Id. at 832. 
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 449. 657 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
  
2021] THE TRAP CHRONICLES, VOL. 1 621 
 
in her home without the tenant’s knowledge.  The Louisiana court upheld the 
PHA’s termination, finding the tenant strictly liable for the actions of her 
daughter’s guest.450   
Bound by HUD v. Rucker, restricted by the principles of administrative 
law, and constrained by otherwise valid anti-drug legislation, the judiciary is 
left without an appropriate legal vehicle to join the movement experienced in 
the criminal law.  Unless an opportunity presents itself, reform must originate 
from the other branches of government.   
2. Legislative Branch 
Congress and state legislatures have left the War’s anti-drug housing 
policy largely intact.  The rules enacted during the War have yet to be 
reviewed or modified, continuing to wreak havoc on the communities and 
families of the prisoners of the War.  Although national housing policy, as a 
substantive area of law, has been largely ignored, the redemptive criminal 
legislation enacted recently mentions housing as a focus area in the 
development of wraparound reentry services.  For example, the Second 
Chance Act promised to 
provid[e] coordinated supervision and comprehensive services for 
offenders upon release from prison, jail, or a juvenile facility, 
including housing and mental and physical health care to facilitate 
re-entry into the community, and which, to the extent applicable, 
are provided by community-based entities.451  
The goals underlying these proposed programs include helping 
“offenders to develop safe, healthy, and responsible family relationships and 
parent-child relationships,”452 as well as the inclusion of the entire family unit 
in the reentry process.453  Moreover, the legislation explicitly authorized grant 
funds to provide housing assistance to adult offenders.454  Aside from this 
scant reference to housing brushed in broad strokes, the Act is silent. 
The more recent First Step Act also considers housing in its reentry 
legislation.  The Act codified the efforts of the Reentry Council, the cabinet-
level agency formed during the Obama Administration that worked to 
 
 450. Id. at 553–54. 
 451. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(3); see also CORINNE CAREY, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED 
ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 17–18 (2004), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
usa1104.pdf. 
 452. Second Chance Act of 2007, supra note 344, § 101(a)(4)(A). 
 453. Id. § 101(a)(4)(B). 
 454. Id. § 111. 
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coordinate supportive services to prisoners returning home.455  The 
legislation calls for federal interagency reentry collaboration among various 
cabinet-level agencies, including HUD, as well as nonprofits and other 
interested stakeholders to coordinate services to support new releasees.456  
The Act also reauthorizes Second Chance Act grant dollars to be allocated to 
agencies and nonprofit organizations involved in transitioning former 
prisoners back into society through coordinated services that include securing 
housing.457  In assessing outcomes, housing was listed as a required 
performance measurement.458  Moreover, the Act directs that the planning for 
transitional housing begin upon admission to jail or prison.459  
While the First Step Act demonstrates a congressional 
acknowledgement of housing as a factor in achieving success in the transition 
from prison back to society, in reality it does little more than identify housing 
as a problem.  The rules enacted during the War contribute to maintaining the 
housing problem and remain completely ignored.  There are no amendments 
to any of the War on Drugs housing legislation.  Indeed, they remain on the 
books and continue to be enforced with vigor by PHAs.  Thus, the redemption 
promised in recent legislation only works to open the prison gates.  It does 
not restore the formerly incarcerated to full citizenship with a clean slate.  
The drug history obtained during the War follows the formerly incarcerated 
individual through the prison gates and operates to close doors of opportunity 
shut by the War’s anti-drug legislation. 
3. Executive 
Beginning with President George W. Bush in 2004, criminal recidivism 
and offender reentry has moved to the forefront of the political agenda.  The 
stance is no longer “tough on crime.”  Instead, it is “second chances.” 
As mentioned above, President Bush proposed a four year $300 million 
reentry grant called the Prisoner Re-entry Initiative (“PRI”) in his 2004 State 
of the Union Address.460  The project operated through a federal partnership 
that included DOJ, the Department of Labor (“DOL”), and HUD.461  The 
purpose of the PRI was to assist ex-offenders in successfully integrating back 
 
 455. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL: A RECORD OF 
PROGRESS AND ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE 13 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
static.nicic.gov/Library/032749.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL]. 
 456. First Step Act of 2018, supra note 9, § 505. 
 457. Id. § 3041 (“Grant Program to Evaluate and Improve Educational Methods at Prisons, Jails, 
and Juvenile Facilities”).  
 458. Id. § 507(a)(1) (“Evaluation of the Second Chance Act Program”). 
 459. Id. § 502(f)(3)(C)(i). 
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into their communities.462  It was designed to provide job training and 
placement, transitional housing, and mentoring to non-violent offenders.463  
The following year, DOL awarded thirty grants to faith-based and 
community organizations to develop employment programs and support 
services in other areas, including housing.464  However, the PRI grant 
appropriation could not be used to provide direct financial housing 
assistance.465  Instead, the expectation was that organizations would develop 
networks with housing providers that would in turn provide the assistance.466  
The interim report indicated that “[p]artnerships with housing providers that 
would allow participants in need of housing to access such services were 
generally not well developed.”467  DOL’s “Final Report” on the PRI included 
housing outcomes, with staff citing “housing as the most significant obstacle 
to reintegration.”468  As the Final Report explains, 
[p]roject managers, case managers, and community justice 
representatives were asked to identify the major challenges that ex-
offenders faced based on their experience in PRI and elsewhere.  
Housing was cited most often by these three types of interviewees, 
and substance abuse was the second most frequently mentioned 
challenge.469 
While criminal backgrounds and lack of funds contribute to the 
difficulty of obtaining housing, Section 8 and public housing rules made the 
top half of the list of reported housing barriers.470  In the end, the largest gap 
in services was reported to be housing.471  The report was published in 2009, 
twelve years ago as of the date of this writing.472  Little has changed. 
The Obama Administration tackled criminal justice reform from the 
outset, but it also touched national housing policy.  As mentioned above, the 
cabinets busily worked to deconstruct the lingering effects of the War on 
Drug in the criminal context.  The administration also quietly implemented 
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policies to reverse administrative practices in other areas influenced by the 
War.  For example, the cabinet-level Reentry Council was established during 
Obama’s administration, with the purpose of assisting prisoners returning 
home.473  The Council consisted of twenty federal agencies charged with the 
administrative oversight and enforcement of legislation. 474  Along with DOJ 
and DOL, HUD was part of the Council.   
A review of housing rules also started to take shape under the Obama 
Administration culminating in calls for PHAs to use their discretion to roll 
back the harshness of the War’s exclusion policies.  HUD Secretary Shaun 
Donovan reminded PHAs in a 2011 letter that the Obama Administration 
believed in second chances and explicitly encouraged PHAs “to allow ex-
offenders to rejoin their families in the Public Housing and Housing Choice 
Voucher programs,” when appropriate.475  Recognizing that a substantial 
number of new releasees intend to return to their families who may live in 
federally-subsidized housing, the letter called for PHAs to balance family 
reunification goals with the safety of housing residents.476  While the letter 
from Secretary Donovan did not have the force of amending the anti-drug 
federal housing statutes on the books, it did provide official executive support 
to PHAs deviating from War calls to exclude whenever an option. 
In 2016, HUD also issued PIH Notice 2015-19, which offered guidance 
on the use of arrests to exclude households from federal housing programs.477  
The notice concluded that an arrest alone is insufficient evidence of criminal 
activity to evict or terminate a tenant, noting the Uniform Landlord Tenant 
Act, which provides that evictions should be dismissed when the notice only 
cites arrest as the basis for the eviction.478  The HUD notice warned that a 
PHA’s notice of noncompliance based on an arrest alone would be legally 
insufficient and result in dismissal.479   
HUD also noted that such practices might lead to concerns under the 
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) in the form of discriminatory effects liability.480  
Although having a criminal history is not a protected trait, criminal records-
 
 473. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY REENTRY COUNCIL, supra note 455, at v. 
 474. Id.   
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based exclusions violate the Act if a housing provider’s practice or policy has 
an unjustified effect, even if the housing provider can show a valid interest 
and there is no evidence of discriminatory intent.481  The fact that people of 
color are arrested at disproportionate rates might create discriminatory effect 
liability in certain areas.  However, a statutory exemption, a relic from the 
War, protects housing providers that exclude individuals convicted of one or 
more enumerated drug crimes, regardless of the discriminatory effect.482  
Nevertheless, the Act requires that the practice or policy serve a substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest to pass muster.483  With this, HUD 
concluded that policies and practices that fail to consider the amount of time 
that passed since the last incident of criminality would likely fall short of the 
required threshold.484  Yet again, the HUD notice only carries the force of the 
Administration’s political will without any real teeth or lasting impact. 
Unlike the reform movement in the context of criminal law, national 
housing policy continues to operate according to the rules and practices 
established during the War.  Congress has yet to revisit the legislation 
imposing harsh consequences for suspicions of drug-related activity, 
exclusions triggered by drug convictions, and terminations based on drug 
abuse.  Although HUD started to refocus housing policy towards a more 
redemptive approach regarding drug offenders, the momentum died with the 
presidential election of Donald Trump and the confirmation of Ben Carson 
as HUD Secretary.  The Trump administration’s focus was on the removal of 
undocumented immigrants from federally subsidized housing programs.485  
The courts, bound by the principle of administrative deference and HUD v. 
Rucker, offer little relief from the War’s draconian regulations, leaving 
returning prisoners and their families at the mercy of PHA discretion.   
 
 481. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2020); see also Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. v. Inclusive Comtys 
Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 541 (2015) (explaining that housing providers may maintain a policy 
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housing market participants of one race or over another.  Id. at 524.  
 482. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4).  Section 807(b)(4) of the Fair Housing Act prohibits protection 
against people for convictions concerning manufacture or distribution.  Thus, a housing provider 
will not be found liable for excluding individuals because they have been convicted of one or more 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article is meant as a call for a review of Wartime legislation and a 
reform of national housing policy.  For the past twenty years, all three 
branches of government contributed to the reform movement in the criminal 
law.  Starting with the judicial branch, major pieces of anti-drug legislation 
were dismantled, culminating in an era of redemption and second chances for 
prisoners of the War.  The contributions of Congress and the Executive 
resulted in the development of release mechanisms to free drug prisoners 
from the overly punitive sentences meted out during the War.  Congress 
amended the law while the Executive modified prosecutorial charging 
practices and resurrected the presidential clemency power.  However, 
national housing policy remains a War stronghold. 
If the political rhetoric of second chances and redemption is to be 
offered as a truth, all areas of substantive of law affected by the policies of 
the War on Drugs should be reviewed and modified.  Housing policy must 
consider the 600,000 people returning annually from America’s prisons and 
jails and the recent legislation further opening the prison gates.  Where will 
they go?  Because housing is understood to be the most difficult challenge in 
the reentry process and is critical to post-incarceration stability, it is 
imperative that federal housing legislation be immediately examined and 
reformed as part of the current broader criminal reform. 
While criminal law reform may have opened the door, the War’s 
policies in other areas of law continue to keep prisoners excluded from 
mainstream society.  This in effect continues the War’s violence on targeted 
groups.  It is just that now it is socio-economic as opposed to criminal.  Such 
a schizophrenic policy sustains the revolving prison door.  With the criminal 
law reform movement serving as a model, it is clear that it will take all three 
branches of government to participate in deconstructing the War’s influence 
on national housing policy.   
In his first 100 days, President Biden demonstrated an interest in 
addressing the housing crisis.  He is showing a promising commitment to 
racial equality in housing and his administration is working to ensure the 
rules reflect this.486  First, he appointed Marcia Fudge, an African American 
lawyer, to the position of HUD Secretary.487  She immediately started the 
rollback of Trump era policies and resurrecting the fair housing work of the 
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Obama Administration.488  In addition, in his proposed Infrastructure plan, 
President Biden earmarked $213 billion to housing with $40 billion allocated 
to updating and upgrading public housing and a promise to build 500,000 
units for low-income families.489  With national attention now being paid to 
the housing issue, now is the time to review and modify HUD rules that work 
to exclude individuals with criminal histories.  With funding available and 
refreshed political will, we can begin thinking of new and innovative ways to 
provide housing to this demographic.   
Reentry, as a substantive area of law, is unique in its bipartisan 
legislative support.  While other areas of law experience severe partisan 
divides, both sides of the aisle support reentry-centered initiatives and have 
done so for the past twenty-five years.  In addition to critically reviewing and 
modifying legislation, a new legislative ideals should be developed that 
reflect the second chance principle in the area of housing. 
Courts should continue to examine subsidized housing rules with an eye 
towards strictly enforcing constitutional due process requirements as well as 
protecting Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure.  The War is no longer an appropriate justification for a constitutional 
exemption.  While administrative deference is essential to the efficient 
workings of government, constitutional protections and the principle of 
fairness should be given full accord. 
One a more local level, partnerships between local government, 
community-based organizations, and private landlords should be explored 
with a strong focus on geographic zones where most prisoners return.  
Financial backing by local government may incentivize private landlords 
typically renting in already depressed areas to loosen exclusionary policies.  
Another suggestion is to create affordable residential units for short-term 
stays for this group with strong ties to supportive services such as job training 
and placement, vocational training, and counseling.  Boots-on-the-ground 
service providers should collaborate with government actors and the private 
market to investigate ways to offer safe and affordable housing to those 
returning home.   
Policymakers and bureaucrats must understand that reentry is not 
strictly a criminal law topic.  It transcends the criminal law and penetrates 
other areas such as housing, employment, public benefits.  True reentry 
requires a commitment to offer a second chance to prisoners in all aspects of 
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life.  Opening the prison gates is the first step in the transition back home.  
But to fully integrate the formerly incarcerated, we must open the door to 
American life by offering real and equal socio-economic opportunity as well 
embodying second chance ideologies in our day-to-day.  
While benevolence and redemption are emerging as the signature creed 
of recent criminal justice reform, zero-tolerance and harsh regulation 
continue to dominate the underlying philosophy of other substantive areas of 
law shaped by the War on Drugs.  This in turn offers a duplicitous political 
promise of a second chance.  Thus, a second chance extends only as far as 
the purpose of release from prison or relief from a criminal sentence.  It no 
longer applies once an individual walks across the threshold of the prison 
gate back into free society.  It is there that the opportunity for a real second 
chance exists and, unfortunately, it is there that violence from the War 
continues in the socio-economic realm of American life. 
